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THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S
PRE- AND POST-ENRON RESPONSES TO
CORPORATE FINANCIAL FRAUD:





In recognition of the seventieth anniversary of the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC or the Commission),
this Article evaluates the SEC's responses to corporate financial frauds
during the early years of the twenty-first century.' Early 2001 disclo-
sures of fraudulent activities at Enron Corp. 2 and the mid-summer
* David S. Ruder is the William W. Gurley Professor of Law at Northwestern
University School of Law and was Chairman of the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission from 1987 to 1989. Yuji Sun and Arek Sycz are graduates of
the class of 2003 from Northwestern University School of Law. Yuji Sun is a senior
analyst of Leaf Group LLC, a Chicago-based law and economics consulting firm. Arek
Sycz is an associate at Kirkland & Ellis LLP. The detailed discussion of the SEC's
disclosure program is an updated version of a senior research paper prepared by Mr.
Sun and Mr. Sycz under Professor Ruder's supervision in the spring of 2003.
1 The Article was prepared in response to an invitation from the Notre Dame
Law School to Professor Ruder to participate on September 23 and 24, 2004, as a
panelist on the subject "The SEC at 70." The brochure advertising the conference
stimulated the subject matter in this Article by its statement that "even some federal
lawmakers who once championed securities deregulation have expressed concern of
late that the SEC has not acted aggressively enough to protect the interests of small
investors."
2 In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative and ERISA Litig, 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 613-37
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (recounting the facts according to the plaintiffs); The Enron Collapse:
Impact on Investors and Financial Markets, Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Capital
Mkts., Ins. and Gov't Sponsored Enters. and the Subcomm. on Oversight Investigation of the
House Comm. on Fin. Sers., 107th Cong. 107-51 (2001) (statement of Robert K. Herd-
man, Chief Accountant, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n); SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF
THE BD. OF Dins. OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (2002) [hereinafter Pow-
ERS REPORT], available at http://www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/PowersReport.pdf;
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2002 announcement by WorldCom, Inc., that it had disguised its true
operating performance by using improper accounting3 resulted in the
adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 4 on July 30, 2002. Although this
Article examines events that took place prior to the Enron disclosures,
it concentrates on the SEC's reactions to the Enron era scandals, in-
cluding its responses to the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.
Part I of this Article will set forth the facts underlying the Enron
collapse. Part II will describe the Commission's enforcement activities
in the area of financial fraud, its corporate governance initiatives, and
its role in the establishment of accounting oversight. Part III will dis-
cuss the Commission's rulemaking and other responses to the Enron
collapse in the disclosure area. Part IV will discuss the SEC's re-
sources. The Article will advance the conclusions that in many re-
spects SEC initiatives guided the Congress in drafting the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and that the SEC's pre- and post-Enron activities evidenced
an active and effective SEC role in regulating U.S. corporations.
I. THE ENRON FACTS
Enron was an old-line energy company, owning electric power-
production facilities and natural gas pipelines. In the 1990s, Enron
repackaged itself as an energy trading company whose primary mode
of business was to trade in various energy vehicles, including contracts
to provide electric power in the future at pre-determined prices and
similar contracts to deliver natural gas, water rights, wind power sys-
tems, broad band transmission systems, insurance, and other
products.
The company pursued an accounting strategy of creating "special
purpose entities" (SPEs), whose purpose was in part to shift debt from
Enron's books and to hide credit risk. In addition to facilitating off-
balance sheet borrowing, the special purpose entities had other ad-
vantages. Many of Enron's investments were in illiquid enterprises,
some of which involved high risk. Enron was able to transfer these
investments to SPEs either to produce an apparent immediate profit
or to eliminate risky investments from its balance sheet. As a means of
improving the effectiveness of these off-balance sheet transactions,
some of Enron's special purpose entities were managed by its Chief
see also John Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, Enron Jolt: Investments, Assets Generate Big
Loss, Part of Charge Tied to 2 Partnerships Interests Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2001,
at Cl.
3 SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., Litigation Release No. 17,558, 77 S.E.C. Dock. 3013
(June 27, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17588.htm.
4 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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Financial Officer, Andrew Fastow, despite conflict of interest
problems. Fastow-managed entities could more easily enter into com-
plicated transactions and could do so in less time because Fastow was
on both sides of the transactions.
In the early fall of 2001, Arthur Andersen, LLP (Andersen), En-
ron's auditor, reviewed one of the special purpose entities and de-
cided that the accounting had been incorrect. On October 16, 2001,
Enron announced it was taking a $544 million after-tax charge against
earnings relating to transactions with LJMZ Co. Investment, a partner-
ship managed by Fastow. Enron also recognized that in prior transac-
tions it had issued its shares in exchange for notes receivable and had
improperly'recorded these transactions as an increase to notes receiv-
able of one billion dollars and an increase in shareholder equity of
one billion dollars. Proper accounting would have been to show the
notes receivable as a reduction in shareholder equity. As a result,
shareholder equity was reduced by $1.2 billion, including an addi-
tional $200 million from 2001 transactions. Enron's stock collapsed
and the company filed for bankruptcy in mid December 2001.
Following the Enron collapse a special committee of the Enron
Board of Directors under the leadership of a new director, William C.
Powers, Jr., the Dean of the University of Texas Law School, investi-
gated transactions between Enron and the investment partnerships
created and managed by Fastow. 5 The Powers Report concluded that
Enron's publicly-filed disclosures "were obtuse, did not communicate
the essence of the transactions completely or clearly, and failed to
convey the substance of what was going on between Enron and the
partnerships."6 It found that oversight of management by Enron's
board and its audit committee was deficient.
7
II. SEC ENFORCEMENT, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND
ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT
A. Enforcement
The SEC's primary method of attacking corporate fraud is
through use of its enforcement powers. It has power to investigate
fraud and power to impose fines and other sanctions in administrative
proceedings and in litigated cases in federal courts. Throughout the
nineties, the SEC brought a large number of enforcement actions in-
5 PowERs REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. Many of the facts described above were set
forth in the Powers Report.
6 Id. at 17.
7 See id. at 9-10.
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volving financial fraud.8 Its active enforcement program has contin-
ued. In recent years, the Commission has initiated a growing number
of enforcement actions. Such actions in each of its fiscal years grew
from 477 in 1998 to 679 in 2003.9 In the Commission's fiscal year
2002, ending on September 30, 2002, the Commission brought 598
enforcement actions.10 During that year, the Commission brought
163 cases involving allegations of improper accounting, misleading
disclosure, and other financial fraud.1' Stephen Cutler, Director of
the SEC's Division of Enforcement, described the activity:
But none of the numbers can convey the remarkable nature of our
cases last year as vividiy as a simple iteration of the names of some of
the companies involved: Xerox, WorldCom, Rite Aid, Adelphia,
Tyco, Enron, Waste Management, Dynegy, Edison Schools, Homes-
tore, Microsoft, PNC Bank, Amazon.com. 12
The Commission's increasing enforcement activities in the finan-
cial fraud area were extremely vigorous given the Commission's lim-
ited budget. 13 Not only were many financial fraud cases initiated, but
the alleged frauds in most cases involved large sums of money. For
instance:
In SEC v. Buntrock, the Commission charged six officers of Waste
Management with perpetrating a massive financial fraud lasting
more than five years in which the company had misstated its pre-
tax earnings by approximately $1.7 billion.' 4
8 Richard C. Sauer, Financial Statement Fraud: The Boundaries of Liability Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 57 Bus. LAW. 955, 958 n.20 (2002).
9 1999 SEC. AND ExCH. COMM'N, ANNUAL REP.; 2000 id.; 2001 id.; 2002 id.; 2003
id. For each of those fiscal years the number of actions filed were: 1998- 477, 1999-
525, 2000- 503, 2001- 485, 2002- 598, and 2003- 679.
10 Linda Chatman Thomsen, Recent SEC Enforcement Cases Presented at the
23d Annual Ray Garrett, Jr. Corporate and Securities Institute (April 2003).
11 Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks Before the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (Dec. 12, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch121
202smc.htm.
12 Id.
13 See discussion of Commission resources infra Part IV. The Commission has
sought to leverage its enforcement resources in various ways. For instance, on Octo-
ber 23, 2001, the Commission released a Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a),
in which it set forth criteria which the Commission will consider "in determining
whether, and how much, to credit self-policing, self-reporting, remediation and coop-
eration" in deciding whether to refrain from bringing enforcement actions, bringing
reduced charges, seeking lighter sanctions, or including mitigating language in docu-
ments. In re Matter of Gisela de Leon-Meredith, Exchange Act Release No. 44,970
(October 23, 2001), 76 S.E.C. Dock. 220 (Oct. 23, 2001).
14 Waste Management, Inc. Founder and Five Other Former Top Officers Sued
for Massive Earnings Management Fraud, Litigation Release No. 17,435, 77 S.E.C.
Dock. 695 (Mar. 26, 2002).
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* In SEC v. WorldCom, the Commission charged WorldCom with a
massive accounting fraud totaling more than $3.8 billion.
15
" In SEC v. Adelphia Communications Corp., the Commission
charged Adelphia Communications Corporation, its founder,
his three sons, and two senior executives with "one of the most
massive financial frauds ever to take place at a public company,"
involving billions of dollars.
1 6
* In SEC v. Kozlowski, the Commission charged three former top
officials of Tyco International, Ltd. with failing to disclose to
shareholders low interest loans, forgiveness of loans, and related
party transactions in the millions of dollars.
17
* In SEC v. Dynegy, Inc., the Commission alleged improper ac-
counting and misleading disclosures at Dynegy, Inc., regarding
the use of special purpose entities and prearranged "wash" trans-
actions involving large sums.
18
* In SEC v. Fastow, the Commission brought one of many actions
in the Enron Corp. investigation, charging Andrew Fastow, the
company's former Chief Financial Officer, with antifraud viola-
tions engaged in for the purpose of enriching himself and mis-
leading investors about Enron's true financial condition.
19
* In SEC v. Safety-Kleen Corp., the Commission charged Safety-
Kleen Corp. and four of its former senior executives with a mas-
sive accounting fraud resulting in a restatement of earnings of
$534 million for a three-year period.
20
15 SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., Litigation. Release No. 17,588, 77 S.E.C. Dock. 3013
(June 27, 2002). For a list of WorldCom related actions, see Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Spotlight on SEC v. WorldCom, at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/worldcom.htm (last
modified July 29, 2004).
16 SEC v. Adeiphia Communications Corp., Litigation Release No. 17,627, 78
S.E.C. Dock. 326, 326 (July 24, 2002).
17 TYCO Former Executives L. Dennis Kozlowski, Mark H. Swartz and Mark A.
Belnick Sued for Fraud, Litigation Release No. 17,722, 78 S.E.C. Dock. 1495 (Sept. 12,
2002).
18 SEC Settles Securities Fraud Case with Dynegy Inc. Involving SPEs and Round-
Trip Energy Trades, Litigation Release No. 17,744, 78 S.E.C. Dock. 1493 (Sept. 25,
2002).
19 SEC Charges Andrew S. Fastow, Former Chief Financial Officer of Enron, with
Fraud, Litigation Release No. 17,762 (Oct. 2, 2002), available at 2002 WL 31425946.
For a list of SEC Enron-related enforcement actions, see Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Spot-
light on Enron, at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enron.htm (last modified Sept. 1,
2004).
20 SEC Sues Former CEO, CFO and Other Top Executives of Safety-Kleen Corp.
for Accounting Fraud; Company Consents to Permanent Injunction; Criminal
Charges Filed Against Two Former Officers, Litigation Release No. 17,891 (Dec. 12,
2002), available at 2002 WL 31770878.
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This record of the Commission's enforcement activities in the fi-
nancial fraud area shows an agency dealing effectively with an unusu-
ally large number of high profile financial frauds.
B. Corporate Governance
The Commission's post-Enron agenda also included improving
corporate governance as a means of protecting investors.2 1 Although
corporate governance has historically been a matter of state regula-
tion, 22 and although the Commission "lacks the authority to promul-
gate rules or regulations directly affecting corporate governance," 23
the Commission has accomplished corporate governance reform by
urging the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers (NASD), and other self-regulatory organiza-
tions (SROs) to adopt listing standards affecting corporate
governance.2 4 Following this pattern, on February 13, 2002, SEC
Chairman Harvey L. Pitt wrote to the Chairman of the NYSE and the
Chairman of the NASD urging the SROs to review corporate govern-
ance listing standards.
25
In response, the NYSE appointed a "Corporate Accountability
and Listing Standards Committee" to study corporate governance.
The Committee issued its report on June 6, 2002,26 and the NYSE is-
sued its initial recommendations for comprehensive changes to the
NYSE's corporate governance listing standards on August 16, 2002.27
The NASD filed a rule change proposal containing substantive
21 In a Wall Street Journal article published shortly after the Enron bankruptcy,
Chairman Pitt promoted better corporate governance through "[m]ore meaningful
investor protection by audit committees" as one approach to prevent future Enrons.
Harvey L. Pitt, Op-ed, How to Prevent Further Enrons, WALL ST.J., Dec. 11, 2001, atA18,
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch530.htm.
22 See Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J.
545, 546-48 (1984); see also MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORA-
TION (1976) (demonstrating the development of corporate law and the history of
state regulations).
23 Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance, 45 ALA. L.
REV. 783, 783 (1994).
24 Schwartz, supra note 22, at 571 n.72.
25 Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Pitt Seeks Review of Cor-
porate Governance, Code of Conduct (Feb. 13, 2002), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/press/2002-23.txt.
26 N.Y. STOCK EXCH., CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING STANDARDS REPORT
(2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/press/NT00565884.html.
27 N.Y. STOCK EXCH., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULE PROPOSALS REFLECTING REC-
OMMENDATIONS FROM THE NYSE CoRPoRATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING STANDARDS
COMMIT-EE AS APPROVED BY THE NYSE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AUGUST 1, 2002 (2002),
available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp-gov-pro-b.pdf.
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changes to its listing standards on October 9, 2002.28 After several
amendments, 29 NYSE and NASD rules were approved by the SEC on
November 4, 2003.30 In adopting the new corporate governance list-
ing standards, both the NYSE and the NASD have acknowledged that
independent directors can effectively perform crucial monitoring
functions. They both recognize that corporations need to have inde-
pendent boards that can exercise their own judgment in overseeing
management. 31 The new listing standards of both SROs require
boards with a majority of independent directors3 2 and independent
audit, compensation, and nomination committees.33 With respect to
the definition of "independence," both SROs adopted requirements
to disqualify directors who had strong business or social relationships
with the company.
3 4
28 Self-Regulatory Organizations, National Association of Securities Dealers, Ex-
change Act Release No. 47,516, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,451-01 (March 25, 2003).
29 N.Y. STOCK EXCH., PROPOSAL RELATING TO DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS
(2003), available at http://www.nyse.com; NAT'L Ass'N OF SEC. DEALERS, AMENDMENT 1
TO RULES 4200 AND 4350 REGARDING BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND INDEPENDENT COMMIT-
TEES (2003), available at www.nasdaq.com.
30 Order Approving Proposed Changes, Self-Regulatory Organizations, Nat'l
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 12,
2003). The final Nasdaq listing standards are available at http://www.nasdaq.com/
about/recentrulechanges.stm (last visited Nov. 18, 2004).
31 On March 31, 2003, a Task Force of the American Bar Association on Corpo-
rate Responsibility issued a report containing a series of recommendations regarding
corporate governance, including the suggestions that the boards of directors should
include a substantial majority of independent directors. AM. BAR ASS'N, THE REPORT
OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2003),
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/final-report.pdf;
see also AM. BAR ASS'N, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK
FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2002), available at http://www.ethicsandlawyer-
ing.com/Issues/files/ABAPrelimReport.pdf.
32 N.Y. STOCK EXCH. LISTED COMPANY MANUAL R. 303A.01 (2004), available at
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=/about/listed/1022221393251.
html; NAT'L ASS'N SEC. DEALERS MANUAL R. 4200(a)(15) (2004).
33 See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., supra note 26, at 912.
34 The NYSE relies on a very general concept: independent directors are those
who have "no material relationship with the listed company (either directly or as a
partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the
company)." N.Y. STOCK EXCH. LISTED COMPANY MANUAL R. 303A.02(a) (2004), availa-
ble at http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=/about/listed/10222213932
51.html. The NASD requires that an independent director have no relationship with
the company that would interfere with the exercise of independent judgments. The
NASD proposal contains more specific disqualifying relationships. NAT'L ASS'N SEC.
DEALERS MANUAL R. 4200(a)(15) (2004), available at http://nasd.complinet.com/
nasd/display/display.html?rbid= 189&record id=1 159001510.
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act followed the SEC in seeking better cor-
porate governance. The Act also deals with board independence, but
mandates reforms only with respect to the audit committee. Section
301 of the Act establishes a new independence standard for audit
committee members by adding subsection (in) to section 10A of the
Exchange Act,3 5 mandating the Commission to direct the SROs by
rule to prohibit the listing of an issuer that is not in compliance with
provisions of that section. 36 Under this new standard, an audit com-
mittee member must be an independent director of the issuer and
must also meet two extra criteria: an audit committee member may
not "(i) accept any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee
from the issuer; or (ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer or any
subsidiary thereof.
3 7
On April 9, 2003, the SEC implemented listed company audit
committee standards provided by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by adopting
a new Rule 1OA-(3) under the Exchange Act.38 The SEC audit com-
mittee rules prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that is not
in compliance with the standards regarding issuer audit committees
enumerated under new § 10A(m) of the Exchange Act.3 9
C. Accounting Oversight
The Enron debacle also highlighted the failure of the accounting
profession to protect investors when auditing public companies' fi-
nancial statements. In January 2002, Chairman Pitt described a new
system for "private regulation of the accounting profession with vigor-
35 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-76
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211 (West Supp. 2004)).
36 Section 2 (7) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act defines "issuer" as a body whose securi-
ties are registered under section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act or who files or
has filed a registration statement that has not yet become effective under the Act. See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 2(7), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7201 (West Supp. 2004); Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 § 3(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2000).
37 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301 (m) (3) (b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (m) (3) (B) (i)
(ii).
38 Standards Relating to Listed Companies Audit Committees, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 8220, Exchange Act Release No. 47,654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16,
2003); see also Standards Relating to Listed Companies Audit Committees, Securities
Act Release No. 8173, Exchange Act Release No. 47,137, 68 Fed. Reg. 2638 (proposed
Jan. 17, 2003).
39 Rules and Regulations Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Re-
ports Under Section 10A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(a) (1)-(2) (2003). This Article does
not discuss the definition of other SEC rules or corporate governance rules mandated
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, such as hiring and firing outside auditors, and audit com-
mittee financial expert and "whistleblower" protections.
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ous SEC oversight," but not self-regulation by the accounting profes-
sion.40 He proposed establishing a new "Public Accountability Board"
(PAB) to assume "auditor and accountant discipline and quality con-
trol," with the majority of its members unaffiliated with the account-
ing profession.4 1 He proposed that independent funding for the new
board be created by imposing "involuntary assessments" on public
companies. He urged vesting the oversight body with "vigorous en-
forcement and investigative powers" to supplement the power of the
SEC. 42 On March 21, 2002, he presented the integrated PAB proposal
to Congress during his testimony before the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.43 On June 26, 2002, a month
before the Sarbanes-Oxley enactment, the Commission proposed
rules to create a PAB with the characteristics suggested by Chairman
Pitt.44
The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation codified the substance of the
Commission's PAB proposal by establishing the Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board (PCAOB), giving it the power to regulate
the audit function of the accounting profession, including power to
register auditing firms, power to establish auditing standards, power
to set quality controls for auditing firms, and power to inspect and
discipline accounting firms.45 Section 101 (b) of the Act specifies that
the PCAOB "shall not be an agency or establishment of the United
States Government" and establishes its status as a nonprofit private
regulatory body.46 Section 101(e)(2) of the Act states that "[t]wo
members, and only 2 members" of the five-member PCAOB "shall be
or have been certified public accountants. ' 47 Codifying the Commis-
sion's suggestion that fees be levied against public companies to fund
the PCAOB, section 109 grants the PCAOB the power to establish "an-
40 Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks at the Twenty-Ninth Annual Securities Regulation In-
stitute (Jan. 23, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch536.htm.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002: Hearing on S.
2673 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 1103
(2002) [hereinafter Hearing] (written testimony of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/032102tshlp.htm.
44 Framework for Enhancing the Quality of Financial Information Through Im-
provement of Oversight of the Auditing Process, Securities Act Release No. 8109, Ex-
change Act Release No. 46,102, 67 Fed. Reg. 44,964-45,001 (June 26, 2002) (codified
as amended in 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 229).
45 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101(a), 116 Stat. 745,
775-76 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211 (West Supp. 2004)).
46 Id. § 101(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(b) (West Supp. 2004).
47 Id. § 101 (e) (2), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211(e) (2).
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nual accounting support" fees which "shall be allocated among and
payable by each issuer."48 Section 107(a) of the Act makes clear that
"[t]he Commission shall have oversight and enforcement authority
over the Board."49 All rules of the PCAOB must be approved by the
Commission and all disciplinary actions taken by the PCAOB are sub-
ject to the Commission's review.50 The Act further provides that other
important aspects of PCAOB operation, including member appoint-
ments and its budget, must be approved by the Commission. 51
The above summary discussion of the Commission's Enron-re-
lated activities in enforcement and corporate governance, as well as its
suggestion that an independent accounting oversight board be estab-
lished, present an SEC that has been forceful and effective in meeting
problems demonstrated by corporate frauds. As the remainder of this
paper demonstrates, its activities centering on improving the corpo-
rate disclosure system were also forceful and effective.
III. THE SEC's DISCLOSURE PROGRAM PRIOR TO AND AFTER ENRON
A. The SEC Disclosure System
The Sarbanes-Oxley reforms are the most far-reaching reforms in
the securities laws regulating corporations since the enactments of the
Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) 52 and the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act). 53 Evaluation of reforms in
the area of disclosures should be made in the context of the compre-
hensive and extensive disclosure system established and enforced by
the Commission since the enactment of the 1930s legislation.
Under the Exchange Act, publicly held companies in the United
States are required to comply with regulations requiring them to dis-
close extensive information about their businesses and finances annu-
ally on Form 10-K, 54 quarterly on Form 10-Q 55 and, when important
events occur, on Form 8-K.56 Under the Commission's integrated dis-
closure concept,57 this disclosure system forms the basis for disclo-
48 Id. § 109(d) (1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7219(d) (1), (g).
49 Id. § 107(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7217(a).
50 Id. § 107(b)-(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7217(b)-(c).
51 Id. §§ 101(e)(4), 109(b), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7211(e)(4), 7219(b).
52 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (2000).
53 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, id. §§ 78a78t (2000).
54 Forms, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1981).
55 Id. § 249.308a.
56 Id. § 249.308.
57 See Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offerings, Exchange Act.
Release No. 18,007, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,902, 41,904 (Aug. 18, 1981) (describing the Com-
mission's integrated disclosure system); Adoption of the Integrated Disclosure Sys-
[VOL. 8o:31112
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sures made by seasoned corporations when they file registration
statements under the Securities Act in connection with the sale of
their securities. The Commission has facilitated this disclosure system
in Regulation S-K by creating uniform disclosure provisions for both
periodic reports and registration statements.
58
As discussed throughout this paper, most of the post-Enron secur-
ities laws reforms have been accomplished through joint efforts by the
Commission and Congress. In many instances, the chosen path for
cooperation between the Commission and Congress involved Com-
mission policy suggestions to Congress followed by congressional
adoption of those policies and direction to the Commission to imple-
ment those policies.
B. The SEC's Disclosure Agenda Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Legislation
The SEC's disclosure requirements have long been considered to
be the most comprehensive in the world, and the Commission has
constantly sought to improve the disclosure system. An assessrent of
the SEC's disclosure responses to the Enron scandal and other scan-
dals can initially be made by reviewing the Commission's agenda be-
ginning in the summer of 2001.
In an August 31, 2001, memorandum, prepared just as the Enron
scandal was emerging, the Commission's Division of Corporation Fi-
nance announced a regulatory agenda including auditor indepen-
dence, revenue recognition guidance, materiality definitions,
restructuring, valuation and loss accruals, segment disclosure, ac-
counting for derivatives, market risk disclosures, pro forma financial
statements, intangible assets, and research and development ex-
penses. 59 This list of Commission concerns demonstrated a long-held
determination to attack current disclosure issues with new rulemaking
and guidance.
60
tem, Exchange Act Release No. 18,524, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (Mar. 16, 1982) (adopting
integrated disclosure); Integrated Disclosure: Proposed Implementing Amendments
Exchange Act Release No. 18,014, 46 Fed. Reg. 42,042 (Aug. 18, 1981) (proposing
revision of schedule and form regime for integrated disclosure system).
58 Standard Instructions for Filing Forms Under the Securities Act of 1933, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Policy Conservation Act of 1975, 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.10 (2003). Regulation S-K covers securities, business, management, registration
statement and prospectus provisions, and other disclosure items.
59 Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Current Accounting and Disclosure Is-
sues, Division of Corporation Finance, at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/acct-
disc.htm (last updated Aug. 31, 2001).
60 In addition to requiring corporate disclosures, the Commission also reviews
registration statements, periodic reports, and other disclosure documents filed with
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Further indication of Commission initiatives during this period
can be gained from speeches, writings, and testimony of Harvey L.
Pitt, who was sworn in as SEC Chairman on August 3, 2001, nearly two
months prior to Enron's restatement announcement on October 16,
2001.61 Early in his tenure, Chairman Pitt set an SEC agenda for re-
form of the disclosure system, primarily through a series of
speeches. 62 On October 22, 2001, he observed that even though the
U.S. disclosure system "is acknowledged to be the best in the world," it
"can, and must, be strengthened and made relevant to our new global
world of rapid communication.
'63
Shortly after taking office, Chairman Pitt expressed the need for
improvement in the Exchange Act periodic reporting system. 64 In his
view, disclosure by reporting companies in periodic intervals on a
quarterly and annual basis inevitably made the information disclosed
to the investor "static." He observed that the companies would "wait
until the end of a quarter to disclose significant information" and the
information, when it finally reached the investors, would often be
stale.65 Addressing this systemic problem, Chairman Pitt suggested as
a solution supplementing the existing periodic disclosure regime with
the Commission for the purpose of assessing the accuracy of disclosures. Since ap-
proximately 14,000 companies file registration statements with the Commission, the
SEC is unable to review all of the documents filed with it. Instead, it has developed a
"selective review" program through which it screens filings and decides whether to
engage in a full or partial review, or no review at all. Even if a review is undertaken,
that review will not be able to identify misrepresentations, inaccurate accounting, and
other problems not discernable from the filed documents. See discussion of Commis-
sion resources infra note 267, app. A.
61 See Emshwiller & Smith, supra note 2.
62 A full list of Chairman Pitt's public remarks, including speeches and Wall Street
Journal articles, are available at http://www.sec.gov; Chairman Pitt seemed to be fol-
lowing the example of his predecessor, Arthur Levitt, who made a series of important
policy pronouncements in speeches. Seasoned SEC observers are aware that speeches
by SEC chairmen are reviewed, edited, and sometimes written by SEC staff members.
The Chairman's speeches, as well as speeches by staff members, are widely seen as
indicators of forthcoming SEC policies.
63 Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks Before the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants (AICPA) Governing Council (Oct. 22, 2001), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/spch5l 6.htm.
64 The SEC's vision of an improved disclosure system was obscured in part by
press reaction to another portion of the AICPA speech in which Chairman Pitt was
criticized for appearing to be too friendly toward the accounting profession. His
statement that the accounting "profession is comprised of individuals who are com-
mitted to our disclosure system, and who are critical partners with us in making finan-
cial disclosures meaningful," id., can be interpreted as an effort to secure progress in
regulating the accounting profession through cooperation rather than acrimony.
65 Id.
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a new concept of "current" disclosure. 66 He suggested that reporting
companies should be required to "disclose unquestionably material
information when it arises and becomes available" rather than waiting
for a periodic report filing deadline. 67 To achieve this goal, he sug-
gested new utilization of technology, particularly the Internet, which
he observed had the capability of "disseminating critical information
quickly" and was "inherently customized: users can find as much or as
little information as they want."68 In other speeches in the fall of
2001, Chairman Pitt further explained his vision of a more current
disclosure system. 69 He believed that the SEC should encourage com-
panies to disclose "trend information to give investors the same kind
of view as is available to the managers of those companies."
70
In addition to suggesting a current disclosure system, Chairman
Pitt discussed other disclosure reforms. He urged public companies
to "consider simplifying financial disclosures to make accounting
statements useful to, and utilizable by, ordinary investors. '7 1 Regard-
ing "pro forma" financial information that does not comply with Gen-
erally Accepted Financial Principles (GAAP), Chairman Pitt observed
that unstructured pro forma financial disclosures were not compara-
ble among different companies and even among different periods of
the same company, 72 and that as a result "there is a strong need for
companies to reconcile 'pro forma' disclosures with mandated GAAP
financial statements.
'73
Enron filed its bankruptcy petition on December 2, 2001. In a
December 11, 2001, Wall Street Journal article, Chairman Pitt reiterated




69 See Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks at the Consumer Federation of America Financial
Services Conference (Nov. 29, 2001) [hereinafter Pitt, Consumer Federation of
America Remarks], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/spch525.htm; Harvey L.
Pitt, Remarks at the Fall Meeting of the American Bar Association Committee on
Federal Regulation of Securities (Nov. 16, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/spch524.htm; Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks at the Practicing Law Institute Thirty-
Third Annual Institute on Securities Regulation (Nov. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Pitt, Prac-
ticing Law Institute Remarks], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/spch520.htm;
Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks at the SEC Historical Society Major Issues Conference (Nov.
14, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/spch523.htm.
70 Pitt, Practicing Law Institute Remarks, supra note 69.
71 Pitt, supra note 63.
72 Pitt, Consumer Federation of America Remarks, supra note 69.
73 Pitt, supra note 21.
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confidence.7 4 He linked the Enron failure to the need for better fi-
nancial disclosure and identified the "lack of clear and transparent
financial statements" as one of the "system flaws" that must be re-
paired.7 5 In a January 2002 speech, he also urged companies to dis-
close the "three, four or five most critical accounting principles upon
which a company's financial status depends, and which involve the
most complex, subjective or ambiguous decisions or assessments."76
Chairman Pitt also discussed Commission initiatives in written tes-
timony given on March 21, 2002, before the Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate. 77 In that testimony, he de-
scribed plans to achieve needed improvements in three areas: inform-
ative and timely public disclosure, oversight of accountants and the
accounting profession, and improvements in corporate governance. 78
He described several SEC initiatives for improving management dis-
cussion and analysis presentation 79 in three areas: critical accounting
policies,80 off-balance sheet obligations,81 and trend information. 2
He also suggested requiring greater clarity in disclosure,8 3 more
timely disclosure,8 4 accelerated disclosure of corporate insider trading





76 Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks at the Twenty-Ninth Annual Securities Regulation In-
stitute (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch536.htm.
77 Hearing, supra note 43, at 1103 (written testimony of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman,
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
78 Id. at 1105-06 (written testimony of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n).
79 Id. at 1109 (written testimony of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n).
80 Id. at 1109-10 (written testimony of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n).
81 Id. at 1110 (written testimony of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n).
82 Id. (written testimony of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
83 Id. at 1110-11 (written testimony of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n).
84 Id. at 1111 (written testimony of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n).
85 Id. at 1112 (written testimony of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n).
86 Id. at 1112-13 (written testimony of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n). In his testimony, Chairman Pitt also suggested corporate governance re-
form, id. at 1113 (written testimony of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n), and asked for legislation permitting increased SEC ability to bar officers
and directors from service at public companies, id. at 1114-16 (written testimony of
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C. The SEC's Activities Improving the Timeliness of Disclosure
Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act introduced "Real Time Is-
suer Disclosure" by amending section 13 of the Exchange Act to re-
quire reporting companies to "disclose to the public on a rapid and
current basis" information which "the Commission, through its rules,
determines necessary." 87 This timely disclosure approach is consistent
with the SEC's approach to disclosure in the period prior to passage
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Commission's subsequent actions in
adopting measures to improve the timeliness of disclosure confirmed
its adherence to that approach.
In a February 13, 2002, press release, the SEC announced its in-
tent to propose changes in corporate disclosure rules as "the first in a
series of steps to improve the financial reporting and disclosure sys-
tem."88 The Commission's action plan included five items: (1) to pro-
vide acceleration of reporting of transactions by company insiders in
company securities, including transactions with the company; (2) to
accelerate deadlines for annual and quarterly reports; (3) to expand
the list of events triggering an 8-K reporting obligation; (4) to require
public companies to post their 1934 Exchange Act reports on their
web sites; and (5) to require disclosure of critical accounting policies
in Management's Discussion and Analysis in annual reports. 89
On April 23, 2002, as part of its response to section 409, the SEC
released its proposals for accelerated periodic disclosure filing dates
and website access to reports.90 Its final rule, "Acceleration of Peri-
odic Report Filing Dates and Disclosure Concerning Website Access to
Reports," was adopted on September 5, 2002.91
Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n). As noted below, he also outlined
Commission proposals for a Public Accountability Board to regulate the accounting
profession and proposed other accounting related reforms, id. at 1116-24 (written
testimony of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n).
87 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 409, 116 Stat. 745, 791
(amending Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (1997 &
West Supp. 2004)).
88 SEC to Propose New Corporate Disclosure Rules, SEC NEws DIG. (Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 12, 2002, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
digest/02-13.txt.
89 Id.
90 Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing Dates and Disclosure Concerning Web-
site Access to Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8089, 67 Fed. Reg. 19,896 (proposed
Apr. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Acceleration Proposing Release].
91 Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing Dates and Disclosures Concerning Web-
site Access to Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8128, Exchange Act Release No.
46,464, 67 Fed. Reg. 58,480 (Sept. 16, 2002) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17
C.F.R.) [hereinafter Acceleration Adopting Release]. In April 2003, the Commission
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1. Acceleration of Periodic Report Deadlines
Regarding acceleration, the Commission noted that the filing
deadlines for periodic reports had not been changed since they were
established in 197092 and observed that many "large seasoned report-
ing companies capture and evaluate information and announce their
quarterly and annual financial results well before they file their formal
reports with the Commission.
'9 3
The Commission sought to bring these spontaneously developed
disclosure practices into its regulatory framework by accelerating the
10-K and 10-Q reporting requirements. Recognizing the burdens of
meeting accelerated schedules, the Commission applied the require-
ment to a relatively narrow group of large companies. It applied the
accelerated filing deadlines to the group of "accelerated filers,"
94 com-
panies that are current in fulfilling their filing requirements95 and
have a "public float 96 of $75 million or more.
9 7
issued a correcting release: Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing Dates and Disclo-
sure Concerning Website Access to Reports; Correction, Securities Act Release No.
8128A, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,880 (Apr. 14, 2003).
92 Acceleration Proposing Release, 67 Fed. Reg. at 19,897.
93 Id. In a 1998 release, the Commission noted that "hundreds of public compa-
nies issue press releases to announce quarterly and annual results well before they file
their reports" with the SEC. Id. at 19,897-98; see also Regulation of Securities Offer-
ings, Securities Act Release No. 7606A, Exchange Act Release No. 40,632A, 63 Fed.
Reg. 67,174 (Dec. 4, 1998) (showing the SEC soliciting comments on whether the
filing deadlines should be shortened for periodic reports under the Securities Ex-
change Act). The SEC commented that, according to research conducted by its Of-
fice of Economic Analysis during the preceding decade, "registrants on average issued
their year-end earnings announcements approximately 43 days after fiscal year end"
and "their quarterly earnings announcements approximately 27 days after period
end." Acceleration Proposing Release, 67 Fed. Reg. at 19,898 n.27.
94 Acceleration Adopting Release, 67 Fed. Reg. at 58,487-91. The definition of
"accelerated filer" is contained in 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b.2 (2003).
95 A company must have been "subject to the reporting requirements of Section
13(a) [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)] or 15(d) [15 U.S.C. § 78o(d)] of the Exchange Act for a
period of at least 12 calendar months preceding the filing of the report" and must
have "filed at least one annual report pursuant to Section 13(a) or 15(d)." Accelera-
tion Proposing Release, 67 Fed. Reg. at 19,899.
96 The Commission defines "float" as "the aggregate market value of the voting
and non-voting common equity held by non-affiliates of the issuer." Id. at 19,911.
The Commission recognized that the definition of "accelerated filer" would not apply
to large foreign reporting companies. The Commission requested comment on
whether it would be advisable to accelerate the reporting deadlines for foreign report-
ing companies. Id. at 19,904.
97 As of the date within no more than sixty and no less than thirty days before the
end of the company's last fiscal year. Acceleration Adopting Release, 67 Fed. Reg. at
58,487-88.
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In order to ease the apprehensions of large reporting companies,
the SEC introduced a three-year phase-in period for the accelerated
deadlines. The deadlines for periodic reports did not change for fis-
cal years ending in 2002. For fiscal years ending on December 15,
2003, or later, the 10-K deadlines were reduced to seventy-five days
while the 10-Q deadline remained intact. For fiscal years ending on
December 15, 2004, or after, the deadline for the 10-K and 10-Q re-
ports were accelerated to sixty days and forty days respectively. The
10-Q report filing deadline for fiscal years ending on December 15,
2005, was set at thirty-five days.98 The different pace of acceleration of
deadlines for annual and quarterly reports reflected an opinion ex-
pressed by the majority of commenters that "it would be more difficult
to accelerate filing of the quarterly report than the annual report."99
Recently, recognizing difficulties for companies attempting to
comply with rules implementing section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act relating to internal controls, the Commission has postponed the
deadlines for accelerated filing by one year.100
2. Website Access
As an additional response to section 409's "Real Time Disclosure"
objectives, the Commission adopted an amendment to Item 101 of
Regulation S-K,101 requiring "accelerated filers" in their annual re-
ports on Form 10-K: (1) to disclose "that the public may read and copy
any material . . . file[d] with the SEC at the SEC's Public Reference
Room;' 0 2 (2) to disclose the address of the company's website; 103 and
(3) to disclose whether the company makes its annual, quarterly, and
Form 8-K reports available on its website, free of charge, "as soon as
reasonably practicable, and in any event on the same day as" the com-
pany filed such reports with the Commission.
10 4
The Commission's reasoning for the website access proposal was
very similar to its reasoning regarding accelerated deadlines. It ex-
plained that the proposal would promote widespread and timely ac-
cess to corporate information enabling investors to make their
investment decisions on an informed basis, thereby advancing effi-
98 Id. at 58,482.
99 Id.
100 Temporary Postponement of the Final Phase-In Period for Acceleration of Pe-
riodic Reporting Filing Dates, Securities Act Release No. 8477, Exchange Act Release
No. 50,254, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,550 (Sept. 1, 2004).
101 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(e) (2004).




NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
cient functioning of the securities market. 10 5 It stated that by posting
reports on-line "accelerated filers" will help to "democratize the capi-
tal markets by enabling many small investors to access corporate infor-
mation just as readily as large institutional investors." 10 6
D. Form 8-K Reform
The SEC's next step on the path toward real-time disclosure was
to implement two proposals made prior to the adoption of Sarbanes-
Oxley, shortening the reporting time periods for the Form 8-K, which
requires prompt disclosure of certain triggering events, and adding
new and revised 8-K disclosure requirements.
On June 25, 2002, more than a month before the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act was signed into law, the Commission proposed adding new disclo-
sure requirements to Form 8-K and accelerating its filing deadlines.
1 0 7
Its final rule was adopted on March 25, 2004.108 The first five sections
of the amended Form 8-K, under the revised numbering system, con-
tain eight newly added disclosure items, two expanded existing items,
two items transferred in part from periodic reports, and nine retained
items.10 9 The items are organized under five headings:
* Section 1: Registrant's Business and Operation: new Item 1.01,
entry into a material agreement not made in the ordinary course
of company's business; 110 new Item 1.02, termination of a mate-
rial definitive agreement;" 1 and retained Item 1.03, bankruptcy
or receivership.'
12
* Section 2: Financial Information: retained Item 2.01, comple-
tion of acquisition or disposition of assets;11 3 retained Item 2.02,
results of operations and financial condition;" 4 new Item 2.03,
105 Acceleration Proposing Release, Securities Act Release No. 8089, 67 Fed. Reg.
19,896, 19,902 (proposed Apr. 23, 2002).
106 Id.
107 Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date,
Securities Act Release No. 8106, 67 Fed. Reg. 42,914 (proposed June 25, 2002).
108 Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date,
Exchange Act Release No. 49,424, 69 Fed. Reg. 15,594 (Mar. 25, 2004).
109 See id.
110 Id. at 15,596.
111 Id. at 15,597.
112 Id. at 15,598.
113 Id.
114 Id. This item was adopted by the Commission in January 2003 in a final rule
addressing pro forma financial measures. See Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Finan-
cial Measures, Securities Act Release No. 8176, Exchange Act Release No. 47,226, 68
Fed. Reg. 4820 (Jan. 30, 2003) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.). The
SEC issued the proposing release on November 13, 2002. See Conditions for Use of
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creation of a direct financial obligation that is material to the
company; 115 new Item 2.04, events triggering a direct financial
obligation or an obligation under an off-balance sheet arrange-
ment that is material to the registrant;11 6 new Item 2.05, costs
associated with exit or disposal activities resulting in material
changes;1 17 and new Item 2.06, material impairments to one or
more company assets under GAAP.
118
Section 3: Securities and Trading Markets: new Item 3.01, notice
from an exchange or a quotation system about failure to satisfy a
listing standard or about delisting of a class of company's securi-
ties, and actions taken by the company resulting in termination
of a listing or a transfer of a listing to another exchange or quo-
tation system;1 1 9 transferred and modified Item 3.02, unregis-
tered sales of equity securities; 120 and transferred and modified
Item 3.03, material modification to the rights of security
holders.
12 1
* Section 4: Matters Related to Accountants and Financial State-
ments: retained Item 4.01, changes in registrant's certifying ac-
countant; 122 and new Item 4.02, non-reliance on previously
issued financial statements, reports, or reviews.
1 23
" Section 5: Corporate Governance and Management: retained
Item 5.01, changes in control of registrant;
12 4 retained and ex-
panded Item 5.02, departure of directors or principal officers,
election of directors, and appointment of principal officers;
12 5
new Item 5.03, relating to amendments to articles or bylaws not
Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Securities Act Release No. 8145, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,790
(proposed Nov. 13, 2002). This item requires reporting companies "to furnish to the
Commission all releases or announcements disclosing material non-public financial
information." Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 68 Fed. Reg. at
4825. This release and the proposing release are discussed here only to the extent of
their effect on the Form 8-K reporting mechanism. The next section of this Part,
"Enhanced Financial Disclosure," discusses the releases in depth. See infra Part III.E.
115 Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date,








123 Id. at 15,604. If they incorporated or relied-on financial statements covering
one or more years for which the company was required to provide audited financial
statements pursuant to requirements of Regulation S-X or Regulation S-B. Id.
124 Id. at 15,605.
125 Id. at 15,605-06.
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proposed in prior statements; 126 retained Item 5.04, temporary
suspension of trading under registrant's employee benefit
plans;12 7 and retained Item 5.05, amendments to the registrant's
code of ethics.
128
In addition to adding new disclosure items, the Commission has
amended the Form 8-K filing dates, requiring companies to file re-
ports on Form 8-K within four business days of a triggering event,' 29
instead of five or fifteen days.
The new Form 8-K disclosure system is a strong part of the corpo-
rate governance and disclosure reform begun by the Commission
prior to the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and later mandated
by the Act. It enhances various components of the reform by forcing
public companies to disclose on a real-time basis major unusual events
and irregularities. In this way, Form 8-K requirements serve as an
early-warning system for investors, highlighting public companies' un-
usual major contracts, material financial exposures (whether such ex-
posures are imminent or potential, definite or contingent), violations
of listing standards, and major changes within the board or senior
management. These reforms of the disclosure system by the Commis-
sion under Form 8-K are very positive.
Regarding the acceleration of 10-K and 1O-Q reporting dates, the
Commission has not moved to the continuous reporting system envis-
aged by Chairman Pitt shortly after he assumed office, but instead has
relied on the existing structure to accelerate the deadlines for peri-
odic reports in a graduated fashion. This gradual acceleration focuses
on two important elements. First, the accelerated deadlines will ini-
tially apply only to large, seasoned companies. The Commission be-
lieves that those companies to a large extent have voluntarily adopted
measures allowing them to communicate with investors in a more
timely fashion. Second, the acceleration is substantial. News about
corporate developments occurring during the preceding year or quar-
ter will become available to investors in shorter time frames: in sixty
days rather than ninety days for 10-K reports and in thirty-five days
rather than forty days for 10-Q reports.
The changes to Form 8-K reporting are more dramatic steps to-
wards achieving real-time issues disclosure, since they both accelerate
126 Id. at 15,606.
127 Id. at 15,595, 15,606.
128 Id. at 15,595. The items in sections 7, 8, and 9 are treated by the Commission
as retained and renumbered items. Id.
129 Expanded from the two days proposed in the Proposing 8-K Release. Addi-
tional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, Securities
Act Release No. 8106, 67 Fed. Reg. 42,914, 42,914 (proposed June 25, 2002).
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the deadlines for Form 8-K reports and substantially expand the num-
ber of events triggering the reporting obligation. By reducing the
time span between the occurrence of a triggering event and the dead-
line to submit a mandatory report from fifteen days to four days, the
Commission has greatly improved the role of Form 8-K as a tool of
current disclosure. By increasing the number of events important
enough to warrant prompt disclosure, the Commission created a bet-
ter timely disclosure system with positive public results.
E. Enhanced Financial Disclosure
In 1998, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt asserted that due to con-
stant pressure to meet or exceed market expectations, publicly traded
companies were too often reporting financial results that were the
products of improper or misleading accounting practices. 130 Since
then, earnings and balance sheet misstatements have been a special
focus of the SEC.
13'
F MD&A Statements
The Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), contained
in Forms 10-K and 10-Q is a critical part of every public company's
financial disclosure.' 32 MD&A constitutes the narrative analysis and
evaluation portion of a registrant's financial disclosure, providing the
investors "an opportunity to see the company through the eyes of
management."' 33 Concerned that historical financial data does not
indicate future operating results or future financial conditions, the
Commission has for many years required registrants to discuss known
trends or uncertainties in the MD&A. The increasing number of cor-
porate financial reporting scandals caused the SEC to focus on various
enhancements to MD&A as a means of enhancing the public company
financial reporting process.
130 See Arthur Levitt, The "Numbers Game": Remarks at the New York University
Business and Law Center Annual Securities Conference (Sept. 28, 1998), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt.
131 Lynn Turner, Revenue Recognition: Remarks at USC SEC and Financial Re-
porting Institute (May 31, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch495.htm.
132 For a detailed discussion of the MD&A requirements, see Linda Quinn & Ot-
tille L. Jarmel, MD&A 2002: Linchpin of SEC Post-Enron Disclosure Reform, in PRACTISING
LAW INST., THE NEW DISCLOSURE & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIME: WHAT EVERY
CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAWYER MUST KNOW 781 (2003).
133 Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condi-
tion and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715, 13,717
(Apr. 23, 1987).
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On January 25, 2002, the Commission issued its Statement About
Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Re-
sulting of Operations (MD&A Financial Condition Statement) ,134 ad-
dressing three areas: liquidity and capital resources including, off-
balance sheet arrangements; certain trading activities that include
non-exchange traded contracts accounted for at fair value; and effects
of transactions with related and certain other parties. 135 These three
areas were particularly relevant to the Enron collapse.
The SEC first asked companies to consider describing in detail
their material sources of liquidity and financing, a request consistent
with Item 303 of Regulation S-K, which requires registrants in their
MD&A to "identify any known trends or any known demands, commit-
ments, events or uncertainties that will result in or that are reasonably
likely to result in the registrant's liquidity increasing or decreasing in
any material way."136 In the context of liquidity and capital resources
disclosure, the Commission also gave special emphasis to disclosure of
off-balance sheet arrangements, a direct response to the Enron situa-
tion. 3 7 As investigations have revealed, Enron disclosed the existence
134 Commission Statement About Management's Discussion and Analysis of Finan-
cial Condition and Results of Operation, Securities Act Release No. 8056, Exchange
Act Release No. 45,321, 67 Fed. Reg. 3746 (Jan. 25, 2002) [hereinafter MD&A Finan-
cial Condition Statement]. This statement, like the Commission's Critical Accounting
Policy Advice, is not a Commission rule, but nevertheless carries substantial weight.
The statement was made in response to a petition by major accounting firms asking
the SEC to issue an interpretive release to provide guidance for public companies in
preparing disclosures for inclusion in annual reports on Form 10-K and other reports
on January 22, 2002. Arthur Andersen LLP et al., Petition to U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission for Issuance of Interpretive Release (Dec. 31, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petndiscl-12312001 .htm.
135 MD&A Financial Condition Statement, 67 Fed. Reg. at 3746.
136 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (1) (2004). In the MD&A Financial
Condition Statement, the SEC asked companies to be more specific and avoid boiler-
plate regarding liquidity. Companies were also reminded that they must identify
known trends and circumstances that could materially affect liquidity if they are "rea-
sonably likely to occur." MD&A Financial Condition Statement, 67 Fed. Reg. at 3748.
Referring back to its 1989 MD&A release, the SEC reminded the registrants that the
"reasonably likely" standard is a lower disclosure threshold than a "more likely than
not" standard. Id. As to the issue of how to identify "known trends," the Commission
reiterated its "probability and magnitude" test requiring disclosure unless the regis-
trant affirmatively determines that the matter is not likely to come to fruition or is not
material. Id. It also provided a detailed list of particular matters for the management
to consider. Id.
137 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (ii). Previously, off-balance sheet ar-
rangements were only briefly mentioned by Regulation S-K in the context of disclos-
ing capital costs. Under Item 303(a) (ii) of Regulation S-K, the issuer was required to
"indicate any material changes in the mix and relative cost of such resources," and in
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of at least some of its SPEs, but "did not communicate the essence of
the transactions completely or clearly, and failed to convey the sub-
stance of what was going on between Enron and the [SPEs]."138 In
response to this lack of disclosure, the Commission has encouraged
registrants to disclose the extent of their reliance on off-balance sheet
arrangements where third parties provide financing, liquidity, or mar-
ket or credit risk support.
The MD&A Financial Condition Statement also addressed disclo-
sure about effects of transactions with related parties, another point of
contention in the Enron collapse. The SEC advised companies that
their MD&A disclosure should contain detailed discussions of material
related-party transactions to the extent needed to provide investors
with an understanding of their current and prospective financial posi-
tions and operating results.'3 9
The Commission has also broadened the scope of "related par-
ties." Under the MD&A Financial Condition Statement, registrants
are encouraged to disclose in the MD&A all material transactions not
only with "related parties" in a traditional sense, but also with certain
other parties "with whom the registrant or its related parties have a
relationship that enables the parties to negotiate transaction terms
that may not be available from clearly independent parties on an
arm's length basis." 140 In the expanded definition of "related parties,"
the nature, purpose and economic substance of, and risks associated
with transactions with unconsolidated SPEs are subject to MD&A dis-
closure. Expanding the scope of "related parties" hopefully will dis-
courage abuse of unconsolidated entity relationships.
Although the SEC declared that the MD&A Financial Condition
Statement "does not create new legal requirements, nor does it mod-
ify existing requirements, ' 141 the statement actually set out a compre-
its discussion to consider changes between equity, debt, and any off-balance sheet
financing arrangements.
138 See PowERs REPORT, supra note 2, at 17.
139 Previously, related-party transactions were required to be disclosed in financial
statements (as footnotes) and in other specific contexts, but were not specifically re-
quired under the MD&A. For example, with respect to certain merger transactions,
Regulation S-X indicates that related-party transactions should be identified and the
transaction amounts stated on the face of the balance sheet, income statement, or
statement of cash flows. Other requirements include, e.g., Item 13 of Form 10-K,
Item 404 of Regulation S-K, and Item 7B of Form 20-F. See PhilipJ. Boeckman &John
C. Cocchiarella, Nuts and Bolts of the New SEC Disclosure Regime: Pro Forma Earnings,
Critical Accounting Policies and MD&A, in PRACTISING LAw INST., PLI's SECOND ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE 33 (2002).
140 MD&A Financial Condition Statement, 67 Fed. Reg. at 3751.
141 Id. at 3747.
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hensive and ambitious plan for reforming MD&A disclosure. In a
departure from previous policy, which had preserved management
flexibility in MD&A disclosure, the Commission has expanded the
scope and detailed standards for MD&A disclosure. This more de-
tailed approach to MD&A should produce better disclosure.
G. The May 2002 SEC Proposals Concerning Critical Accounting Policies
On December 17, 2001, while the collapse of Enron was still
under investigation, the SEC began its attempts to improve public
company financial disclosure by issuing a Cautionary Advice Regard-
ing Disclosure about Critical Accounting Policies.142 Under this cau-
tionary advice, the Commission encouraged public companies to
include in their MD&A full explanations of their "critical accounting
policies." According to the SEC, these policies are both "important to
the portrayal of a company's financial condition and results" and in-
volve management's subjective judgments and estimations that are
"inherently uncertain.' 43
In May 2002, the SEC continued its attention to discussion of crit-
ical accounting policies in MD&A by proposing to expand the disclo-
sure about the application of critical accounting policies (the Critical
Accounting Policies Release). 144 Even though the proposed rule has
not been adopted, it provides guidance for registrants. The proposed
rule would amend Item 303 of Regulation S-K and would create a new
section in the MD&A. Specifically, the MD&A would include two new
areas: identification and comprehensive description of critical ac-
counting estimates used in preparing the financial statements, and
identification and comprehensive description of the initial adoption
of an accounting policy that has a material impact on the financial
presentation. 145
Under the proposal, the disclosure regarding estimates would be
triggered under a difficult "highly uncertain" test, and the proposal
142 Securities Act Release No. 8040, Exchange Act Release No. 45,149, 66 Fed.
Reg. 65,013 (Dec. 17, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/33-
8040.htm. Note that this advice is not part of a rulemaking procedure, but an indica-
tion of how the Commission expects to interpret its rules, including Regulation S-K.
The statement carries substantial weight.
143 Id. at 65,013.
144 Proposed Rule: Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis about the
Application of Critical Accounting Policies, Securities Act Release No. 8098, Ex-
change Act Release No. 45,907, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,620 (May 20, 2002).
145 Id. at 35,626.
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would require comprehensive and complex disclosure. 146 Although
the failure to adopt the proposal may indicate the SEC's acceptance of
arguments that the proposal is too complicated, it seems likely that
the SEC will continue to make MD&A the central item for disclosure
of material subjective judgments made by management in the prepa-
ration of financial statements.
H. Requirements Under Section 401 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Section 401(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act added a new section
130) to the Exchange Act requiring the SEC to adopt rules requiring
disclosure of off-balance sheet arrangements in periodic reports. Ac-
cording to Congress, new Section 13(j) of the Exchange Act dealing
with off-balance sheet arrangements was adopted to address "the
problems of Enron and its special purpose entities."1 47 Specifically,
this section required the SEC to issue final rules by January 26, 2003,
providing that each annual and quarterly report required to be filed
disclose
all material off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obliga-
tions (including contingent obligations), and other relationships of
the issuer with unconsolidated entities or other persons, that may
have a material current or future effect on financial condition,
changes in financial condition, results of operations, liquidity, capi-
tal expenditures, capital resources, or significant components of
revenues or expenses.
148
The language of new Section 13(j) indicates that the drafters of
this section were influenced by the SEC's expressions of concern re-
garding off-balance sheet arrangements, including its January 2002
MD&A Financial Condition Statement.
49
Although Section 13(j) deals with specific aspects of financial dis-
closure, it uses general and broad terms, such as "other relationships,"
"other persons," and "may" that require explanation for the rule to
operate. The Act did not specify where and how the required new
146 For a discussion of the potential burden that may be imposed by the critical
accounting estimates disclosure, see John J. Huber & Thomas J. Kim, The Response to
Enron: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Commission Rulemaking, in PRACTISING LAW
INST. 34TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 61,154-55 (2002).
147 S. REP. No. 107-205, at 28 (July 3, 2002).
148 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 401(a)(j), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(j) (West Supp.
2004).
149 Securities Act Release No. 8056, Exchange Act Release No. 45,321, 67 Fed.
Reg. 3746 (Jan. 25, 2002).
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disclosures should be made and delegated the power to the Commis-
sion to carry out the purposes of the section.
150
On January 27, 2003, the SEC implemented section 401 of the
Act by adopting amendments to MD&A in Item 303 of Regulation S-
K 151 The final rules define the term "off-balance sheet arrangement"
as any transaction, agreement, or other contractual arrangement to
which an entity that is not consolidated with the issuer is a party,
under which the issuer has
1. any obligation under certain guarantee contracts; 152
2. a retained or contingent interest in assets transferred to an un-
consolidated entity or similar arrangement that serves as credit,
liquidity or market risk support to that entity for such assets;
3. any obligation under certain derivative instruments; 153 or
150 On November 4, 2002, the SEC began implementing that section by proposing
a series of amendments to Item 303 of Regulation S-K. The SEC also used this oppor-
tunity to codify certain portions of the MD&A Statement regarding off-balance sheet
arrangements and contractual obligations. The proposal would have required regis-
trants to provide, in a separate MD&A section, a comprehensive discussion of off-
balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations (including contingent obliga-
tions), and other relationships with unconsolidated entities or other persons that
have, or may have, a material effect on financial condition, changes in financial condi-
tion, revenues and expenses, results of operations, liquidity, capital expenditures, or
capital resources. The proposals would also have required that registrants provide an
overview of their aggregate contractual obligations and contingent liabilities in a tabu-
lar format. See Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis About Off-Bal-
ance Sheet Arrangements, Contractual Obligations and Contingent Liabilities and
Commitments, Securities Act Release No. 8144, Exchange Act Release No. 46,767, 67
Fed. Reg. 68,054 (Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements Final
Release].
151 Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis About Off-Balance Sheet
Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations and Contingent Liabilities and
Commitments, Securities Act Release No. 8182, Exchange Act Release No. 47,264, 68
Fed. Reg. 5982 (Feb. 5, 2003) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.) [here-
inafter Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements].
152 The SEC notes that the "guarantee contracts" that fall under the scope of dis-
closure are the contracts that have characteristics identified in paragraph 3 of FASB
Interpretation No. 45. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION No.
45, GUARANTOR'S ACCOUNTING AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR GUARANTEES, IN-
CLUDING INDIRECT GUARANTEES OF INDEBTEDNESS OF OTHERS 7 (2002), available at
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fin%2045.pdf.
153 The SEC notes that the "obligation" covers any obligation, including a contin-
gent obligation, under a contract that would be accounted for as a derivative instru-
ment, except that it is both indexed to the issuer's own stock and classified in
stockholders' equity in the issuer's statement of financial position, and therefore ex-
cluded from the scope of FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133.
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4. any obligation (including contingent obligations) arising out of
a variable interest in an unconsolidated entity that is held by
and material to the issuer, where the unconsolidated entity pro-
vides financing, liquidity, market risk or credit risk support to,
or engages in leasing, hedging or research and development
services with, the issuer.
154
This final definition clearly indicates that the focus of the rule is
off-balance sheet arrangements that are used by the registrant to pro-
vide financing, liquidity, market risk or credit risk support, or to en-
gage in leasing, hedging, or research and development services.
15 5
Under the final rules, the disclosure of off-balance sheet arrange-
ments is triggered when the arrangements "have or are reasonably
likely to have" a current or future effect on the issuer's financial con-
dition, changes in financial condition, revenues or expenses, results of
operations, liquidity, capital expenditures, or capital resources that is
material to investors.
1 5 6
See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FIN. AccOUNTING STANDARDS No.
133, ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING ACTIVITIES (1998).
154 Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, 68 Fed. Reg. at 5987-88.
155 Some commentators were particularly concerned that the SEC's proposed defi-
nition would not serve the purpose of providing more understandable financial infor-
mation to the investors. See, e.g., Letter from Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities, American Bar Association, to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(Dec. 31, 2002) [hereinafter ABA Comment Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s74202/skellerl.htm. The final definition is narrower and is re-
stricted to the arrangements that serve financing, liquidity and risk support functions.
See, e.g., Letter from KPMG, LLP, to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec.
9, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74202/kpmgl.htm.
156 Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, 68 Fed. Reg. at 5990. This "reasonably
likely" disclosure threshold is consistent with the existing disclosure threshold in Item
303 under which information that could have a material effect on financial condition,
changes in financial condition, or results of operations must be included in the
MD&A, SEC's 1989 Interpretive Release on MD&A Disclosure, Securities Act Release
No. 6835, Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427 (May 18, 1989), and
is also consistent with the threshold under the MD&A Financial Condition Statement,
Securities Act Release No. 8056, Exchange Act Release No. 45,321, 67 Fed. Reg. 3746,
3748 (Jan. 25, 2002). The proposed rules would have introduced a very different "not
remote" threshold. In the proposing release, the SEC seemed to have concluded that
the term "may" in Section 13(j) indicated that Congress contemplated a standard for
disclosure of off-balance sheet items more stringent than the existing "reasonably
likely" standard. The SEC seems to have been convinced by many commentators that
such a stringent standard is not required by the Act. See, e.g., ABA Comment Letter,
supra note 155. The SEC adopting release provides guidance concerning application
of this disclosure threshold. Management must assess the likelihood of the occur-
rence of any known trend, demand, commitment, event, or uncertainty that could
affect an off-balance sheet arrangement. According to the final rule release, the
proper test for such assessment is the traditional "probability and magnitude" test, as
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Once the applicable off-balance sheet arrangements are identi-
fied, the rules require registrants to make comprehensive disclosures,
including (1) the nature and business purposes of these arrange-
ments, (2) the importance of these arrangements to the financial con-
dition of the registrant, (3) the magnitude and material impact of
these arrangements as well as circumstances that may trigger obliga-
tions under these arrangements, and (4) risks of termination of bene-
fits from the arrangements.
157
It is important to note that disclosure of information under these
categories is not necessarily mandatory, because disclosure is required
only "to the extent necessary for an understanding of the applicable
transactions and their effects."1 58 The proposed rules, which followed
the policy of the MD&A Financial Condition Statement, would have
mandated these specific disclosures. 159 The Commission did not
adopt the mandatory standard, and instead continues to place on
management the burden of deciding what disclosures should be made
in MD&A.160 Nevertheless, the new definitions of "off-balance sheet
arrangement" should result in new, detailed, and informative disclo-
sure regarding such arrangements.
The final rule also requires disclosure of aggregate contractual
obligations and contingent liabilities. 161 Although the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act does not mandate such disclosure, the SEC's 401(a) implementa-
tion rules seized the opportunity to codify proposals regarding con-
tractual obligations and contingent liabilities initiated by the MD&A
Financial Condition Statement.1 62 The rules require companies to
previously adopted by the 1989 MD&A release and reiterated under the MD&A state-
ment. See MD&A Financial Condition Statement, 68 Fed. Reg. at 3748-49.
157 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (4) (i) (A)-(D) (2004).
158 Id. § 229.303(a) (4) (i).
159 Some commentators pointed out that such detailed disclosure requirements
were both unnecessarily complex and overly prescriptive. See, e.g., Letter from Cleary,
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 9,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74202/clearygottl.htm. To
address this concern, the Commission's final rules take a more "principles-based" ap-
proach with respect to these specific disclosure requirements. The SEC acknowl-
edged in the adopting release that "the amendments contain a principles-based
requirement." Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, 68 Fed. Reg. at 5989.
160 The SEC stated that "[c]onsistent with traditional MD&A disclosure, manage-
ment has the responsibility to identify and address the key variables and other qualita-
tive and quantitative factors that are peculiar to, and necessary for, an understanding
and evaluation of the company." Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, 68 Fed. Reg. at
5985.
161 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (4) (ii).
162 MD&A Financial Condition Statement, Securities Act Release No. 8056, Ex-
change Act Release No. 45,321, 67 Fed. Reg. 3746, 3749 (Jan. 25, 2002).
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provide a tabular presentation of known contractual obligations, re-
ferring to the following categories of obligations: (i) long-term debt,
(ii) capital lease obligations, (iii) operating leases, (iv) purchase obli-
gations, and (v) other long-term liabilities reflected in the issuer's bal-
ance sheet under GAAP. The table must disclose the aggregate
amounts of such obligations that will become due within less than one
year, within one to three years, within three to five years, and after five
years as of the end of latest fiscal year:' 63 Currently, the GAAP stan-
dard requires, throughout the registrants' financial statement, disclo-
sure of contractual obligations to make future payments under the
categories (i), (ii), and (iii) listed above. 164 The purpose of this dis-
closure is not to repeat the GAAP required disclosures, but to put "ag-
gregated information about contractual obligations and contingent
liabilities and commitments in a single location."1 65 Compared to the
traditional narrative discussion of MD&A, this tabular disclosure for-
mat is more visual, making it easier for readers to compare relevant
information among periods.
166
163 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (5) (i).
164 See, e.g., Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, 68 Fed. Reg. at 5994; FIN. ACCOUNT-
ING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 13, ACCOUNTING
FOR LEASES (1976); FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS No. 47, DISCLOSURE OF LONG TERM OBLIGATIONS (1981); FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 129, DISCLOSURE OF
INFORMATION ABOUT CAPITAL STRUCTURE (1997).
165 Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements Final Release, Securities Act Release No.
8144, Exchange Act Release No. 46,767, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,054, 68,062 (Nov. 8, 2002).
166 The final rules require disclosure of information that the registrant believes is
necessary for an understanding of the "specified material effects" of its off-balance
sheet arrangements. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (4) (i). Registrants may
find that, under certain circumstances, they must make projections in order to ex-
plain the future effects of applicable off-balance sheet arrangements. Consistent with
its approach in the Critical Accounting Policies Release, the Commission recognized
in its Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements Final Release that "some of the disclosure re-
quired by the rules on off-balance sheet transactions and contractual obligations
would require disclosure of forward-looking information." Off-Balance Sheet Ar-
rangements Final Release, 67 Fed. Reg. at 68,065. The result is that this forward-
looking information is mandated by the SEC. In order to make clear that the for-
ward-looking disclosure is mandated, the SEC has eliminated a portion of the instruc-
tions in the MD&A rules that state that registrants are not required to provide
forward-looking information. See, e.g., Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (Instruc-
tion 7). To ease the burden attached to forward-looking statements, the instructions
to Item 303 specifically state that the safe harbor for forward-looking information
provided by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the Reform Act) will
apply to forward-looking information that is required to be disclosed by the rules.
Instruction (c) to paragraph (b) of Item 303 states that the safe harbor provisions of
Section 27A of the Securities Act and Section 21E of the Exchange Act will apply to
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The final rules establish concrete requirements and guidance for
the MD&A discussion with respect to off-balance sheet arrangements
and material contractual obligations. The requirements direct com-
panies to present a complete and meaningful picture of transactions
between the company and its unconsolidated affiliates. Focusing on
the true purpose and impact of these transactions, the rules are de-
signed to discourage the abuse of unconsolidated special purpose en-
tities. Investors should benefit from the improved MD&A
presentation, including the more understandable tabular formula for
aggregated contractual obligations.
1. The SEC's Rulemaking Regarding Pro Forma Financial
Information
Pro forma earnings statements present a company's earnings in a
different, and usually more favorable, light than permitted by U.S.
GAAP. Pro forma earnings frequently exclude a wide range of ex-
penses, such as interest, taxes, or amortization, and sometimes in-
clude unusual gains in income in a manner that would not be allowed
under GAAP.
During the 1990s companies increasingly began using pro forma
earnings in their press releases and in SEC filings. 167 Since there was
no uniform standard for pro forma reporting and since in many cases
GAAP results did not accompany the pro forma figures, it was particu-
larly difficult for investors to evaluate and compare the performance
of companies based on pro forma information.
forward-looking statements provided pursuant to paragraph (c) of Item 303. The safe
harbor protection available to the MD&A disclosures are improved over the statutory
safe harbor in the Reform Act because the "meaningful cautionary statement 'require-
ment' will be satisfied if a registrant satisfies all of its off-balance sheet arrangements
disclosure requirements." Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements, 68 Fed. Reg. at 5993. All
information provided in response to the rules, except for historical facts, will be
deemed to constitute forward-looking statements within the meaning of the safe
harbor.
167 In 1973, the Commission issued Accounting Series Release No. 142, warning of
possible investor confusion from the use of financial measures outside of GAAP:
"[T]he unilateral development and presentation on an unaudited basis of various
measures of performance by different companies which constitute departures from
the generally understood accounting model has led to conflicting results and confu-
sion for investors." Reporting Cash Flow and Other Related Data, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5377, Exchange Act Release No. 10041, 38 Fed. Reg. 9158 (Apr. 11, 1973).
Nevertheless, SEC rules only regulated the use of pro forma information in the nar-
row context of certain merger transactions. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2004).
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2. The SEC Cautionary Advice Regarding Pro Forma Financial
Information
In an effort to address the concerns raised by the use of pro
forma earnings, the SEC issued its Cautionary Advice Regarding the
Use of "Pro Forma" Financial Information in Earnings Releases (Pro
Forma Advice) on December 10, 2001.168 The Pro Forma Advice de-
scribed pro forma financial information as earnings and results of op-
erations presented "on the basis of methodologies other than
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles."169  The Commission
warned reporting companies using non-GAAP measures that an-
tifraud provisions applied to companies providing pro forma financial
information in a misleading fashion. It reminded companies that the
omission of material information may be misleading, despite the fact
that a company's financial results may be literally true.170
Although the Pro Forma Advice contained warnings, the SEC ac-
knowledged that non-GAAP information may serve a useful purpose,
indicating that interpretations to GAAP results and summaries of
GAAP financial statements are not prohibited. 171 Nevertheless, it indi-
cated that pro forma information must be presented in a way that is
not misleading and allows meaningful comparisons with GAAP and
prior non-GAAP presentations. On January 16, 2002, the Commission
demonstrated its seriousness about pro forma earnings when it an-
nounced the settlement of an enforcement action against Trump Ho-
168 Securities Act Release No. 8039, Exchange Act Release No. 45,124, 66 Fed.
Reg. 63,731 (Dec. 10, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/33-8039.
htm.
169 Id. at 63,732.
170 The SEC for the first time attempted to provide practical guidance regarding
use of pro forma financial information. The SEC encouraged public companies to
"consider" the earnings press releases guidelines jointly developed by Financial Exec-
utives International (FEI) and the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI). The
FEI/NIRI guidelines suggested, among other things, that companies provide, in tabu-
lar format, a reconciliation of any pro forma results to GAAP. Id. The FEI/NIRI
guidance provides:
It is important to provide the pro forma results in context of their GAAP
framework. The order in which reported or pro forma results are presented
in the release is not as important as their context. Pro forma results should
always be accompanied by clearly described reconciliation to GAAP results;
this reconciliation is often provided in tabular form.
NAT'L INVESTOR RELATIONS INST., THE FEI/NIRI EARNINGS PRESS RELEASE GUIDELINES
(2001), available at http://www.niri.org/publications/alerts/EA120401.cfm.
171 Cautionary Advice Regarding the Use of "Pro Forma" Financial Information in
Earnings Releases, 66 Fed. Reg. at 63,732.
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tels & Casinos Resort, Inc., in which it found pro forma earnings to be
presented in a misleading fashion.
1 72
3. Relevant Provisions under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Section 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required the SEC, not
later than 180 days after enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (i.e., by
January 26, 2003), to issue final rules providing that any pro forma
financial information included in a periodic report or in any other
public disclosure must be presented in a manner that (1) does not
contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the pro forma financial informa-
tion, in light of the circumstances under which it is presented, not
misleading (the antifraud provision) ;173 and (2) reconciles that infor-
mation with comparable financial information prepared under
GAAP. 174 The antifraud and comparable information requirements
under this section are consistent with the Commission's prior Pro
Forma Advice, and clearly reflect SEC influence on the legislative
process.
4. The SEC's Rules Implementing Section 401 (b) of the Act
On January 22, 2003, the SEC adopted rules implementing sec-
tion 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 175 The SEC regulation, Regu-
lation G, requires public companies that disclose or release any
applicable "non-GAAP financial measures" to provide a presentation
of the most comparable GAAP financial measure and to reconcile the
172 The cease and desist proceedings against Trump Hotels & Casinos Resorts,
Inc., was based upon Trump's release of pro forma earnings without revealing that
results were attributable to an unusual one-time gain rather than to operations. In re
Trump Hotel & Casino Resorts, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Release No. 1499,
[2001-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 75,014, at 63,251 (Jan. 16,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-4528 7 .htm. The Com-
mission's press release announcing the action emphasized that the action was the first
brought by the Commission based upon pro forma earnings financial reporting.
Press Release, Securities & Exchange Commission, SEC Brings First Pro Forma Finan-
cial Reporting Case (Jan. 16, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2002-6.txt.
173 This language is similar to SEC Rule 10b-5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004),
the Commission's primary antifraud rule.
174 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 401(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (West Supp. 2004).
175 See Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 8145, Exchange Act Release No. 46,788, 68 Fed. Reg. 4820 (Jan. 30, 2003);
see also Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Securities Act Release
No. 8145, Exchange Act Release No. 46,788, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,790 (proposed Nov. 13,
2002).
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non-GAAP financial measure to the most comparable GAAP financial
measure. The SEC also amended Item 10 of Regulation S-K to pro-
vide additional guidance to those registrants that include non-GAAP
financial measures in SEC filings.
17 6
Regulation G defines a "non-GAAP financial measure" as a nu-
merical measure of an issuer's historical or future financial perform-
ance, financial position, or cash flow that
* Excludes amounts, or is subject to adjustments that have the ef-
fect of excluding amounts, that are included in the most directly
comparable measure calculated and presented in accordance
with GAAP in the statement of income, balance sheet or state-
ment of cash flows (or equivalent statements) of the issuer; or
* Includes amounts, or is subject to adjustments that have the ef-
fect of including amounts, that are excluded from the most di-
rectly comparable measure so calculated and presented.
1 77
Regulation G applies whenever a registrant publicly discloses ma-
terial information that includes a non-GAAP financial measure.178 As
part of such disclosure the registrant must (1) present the most di-
rectly comparable financial measure calculated and presented in ac-
cordance with GAAP and (2) reconcile the differences between the
non-GAAP financial measure and the most directly comparable finan-
cial measure presented in accordance with GAAP.
179
176 As noted earlier, under the new Form 8-K registrants must file earnings re-
leases or similar announcements on Form 8-K, with those filings subject to the gui-
dance in amended Item 10 of Regulation S-K. See discussion supra at Part III.D.
177 Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4821. In
the release adopting Regulation G, the Commission made efforts to clarify the defini-
tion by adding both inclusive and restrictive instructions with specific examples. Id. at
4823. The inclusive instructions indicate that non-GAAP measures include all
presentations that describe either a measure of performance that is different from
GAAP calculation (such as income or loss before tax, or net income or loss), or a
measure of liquidity that is different from cash flow or cash flow from operations
according to GAAP. Examples include EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) and
EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization). Id.
178 Regulation G does not apply to a registrant's SEC filings, which are covered by
amendments to Item 10 of Regulation S-K, discussed infra notes 182-86 and accompa-
nying text.
179 Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4824. If
the issuer discloses or releases publicly any material information that includes a for-
ward-looking non-GAAP financial measure, the issuer must provide reconciliation to
the comparable financial measure calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP
unless doing so would require unreasonable efforts. If a registrant releases an appli-
cable non-GAAP financial measure orally, by telephone, by webcast, or by broadcast
or similar means, Regulation G allows the required accompanying information to be
provided on the company's website. Id. at 4826.
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Serving the antifraud goal contained in the first clause of section
401 (b), Regulation G does not provide a safe harbor to registrants
who comply with it. Regulation G expressly states that a person's com-
pliance or non-compliance with the requirements of Regulation G
does not affect that person's liability under section 10(b) or Rule lOb-
5.180
The SEC also amended Item 10 of Regulation S-K, providing simi-
lar but more stringent disclosure requirements regarding the use of
non-GAAP financial measures.1 8 1 The amended Item 10 applies to
the same categories of non-GAAP financial measures covered by Regu-
lation G, but only in SEC filings.
Similar to Regulation G, the new Item 10(e) of Regulation S-K
requires all SEC filings containing a non-GAAP financial measure to
include
(A) A presentation, with equal or greater prominence, of the most
directly comparable financial measure or means calculated and
presented in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Prin-
ciples (GAAP);
(B) A reconciliation (by schedule or other clearly understandable
method), which shall be quantitative for historical non-GAAP mea-
sures presented, and quantitative, to the extent available without
unreasonable efforts, for forward-looking information, of the differ-
ences between the non-GAAP financial measure disclosed or re-
leased with the most directly comparable financial measure or
measures calculated and presented in accordance with GAAP
182
Additionally, Item 10(e) contains two provisions not in Regula-
tion G, requiring
(C) A statement disclosing the reasons why the registrant's manage-
ment believes that presentation of the non-GAAP financial mea-
sures provides useful information to investors regarding the
registrant's financial condition and results of operations; and
(D) To the extent material, a statement disclosing the additional
purposes, if any, for which the registrant's management uses the
non-GAAP financial measure[s] .... 183
180 Regulation G, 17 C.F.R. § 244.102 (2004).
181 Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4820.
182 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(e) (1)(i)(A)-(B); Conditions for Use of
Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4831.
183 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(e)(1)(i)(C)-(D); Conditions for Use of
Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4831.
1136 [VOL. 8o:3
AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
These more stringent Item 10(e) additional requirements focus
on disclosure of the reasons justifying the use of non-GAAP measures.
The Commission indicated that "the justification for the use of the
measure must be substantive," and the fact that the non-GAAP finan-
cial measure is used by or useful to analysts cannot itself justify the use
of the non-GAAP financial measure. 184 It is reasonable to predict that
these additional requirements will discourage massive use of non-
GAAP measures, thus effectively forcing registrants to provide only the
most valuable non-GAAP measures in their SEC filings.
18 5
In summary, the SEC rules implementing section 401 (b) establish
comprehensive and detailed disclosure standards for using non-GAAP
financial measures, while preserving antifraud remedies. The rules
are consistent with the SEC's concerns and positions expressed before
the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
L Introduction to Management Certification
As discussed above, the Exchange Act requires public companies
to make information available to investors on a regular basis through
a series of periodic reports. The annual report on Form 10-K and
quarterly reports on Form 10-Q are heavily relied on by investors to
make their investment decisions. If these periodic reports convey
false information, investors will be injured and capital markets will be
impaired. Under SEC rules, management is directly responsible for
making disclosures to the public. Since 1980, a reporting company's
principal executive officers, principal financial officers, and principal
accounting officers, together with the majority of the board of direc-
tors, have been required to sign the annual report on Form 10-K on
behalf of the company.186 Principal financial officers and principal
accounting officers have also been required to sign Form 10-Q but
184 Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4824
n.44.
185 In addition to the mandated disclosure requirements, amended Item 10 of
Regulation S-K prohibits the use of certain kinds of non-GAAP financials. 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.10(e) (1) (ii). For example, registrants cannot use non-GAAP liquidity measures
that exclude charges or liabilities that require cash settlement absent an ability to
settle in another manner. Id. § 229.10(e)(1)(ii) (A). However, EBIT and EBITDA
measures are expressly carved out from this prohibition. The release adopting the
rule indicates that the exception from this prohibition for EBIT and EBITDA was
adopted in light of the wide and recognized existing use of these measures. Condi-
tions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 68 Fed. Reg. at 4824.
186 This requirement was adopted by the SEC in 1980. See Amendments to Annual
Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations, and Guides; Integration of Securi-
ties Act Disclosure Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 17,114, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630
(Sept. 25, 1980).
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principal executive officers have not been required to sign the 10-
Q. 1
87
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains three provisions requiring cor-
porate executives to certify the accuracy of reports filed with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission. Section 302 mandates the SEC to
require by rule that the CEO and CFO provide certifications regard-
ing the accuracy of financial information and the design and mainte-
nance of internal controls.1 88 Section 404 mandates the SEC to
require by rule that management provide an internal control re-
port.189 Section 906 requires the CEO and CFO of each reporting
company to certify that the company's periodic reports fairly present
the financial condition and results of operations of the company, and
provides criminal penalties for false certifications.1 90 The three over-
lapping certification requirements clearly reflect congressional reac-
tions to prior SEC proposals for executive certifications.
In fulfilling its congressional rulemaking mandates, the SEC has
combined the sections 302 and 404 certification requirements into
Rule 13a-15, which requires reporting companies to maintain, and
their managements to evaluate, "disclosure controls and procedures"
and "internal control over financial reporting."191 Under Rule 13a-14
each certification must be included in the Form 10-K and 10-Q re-
ports (and the section 906 certification must be furnished). 92
In 1998, the SEC proposed requiring officers and directors to cer-
tify that periodic reports were accurate. The SEC renewed that propo-
sal on June 17, 2002.193 On June 25, 2002, it ordered the CEOs and
CFOs of the nation's largest public companies to certify that their
companies' most recent annual financial statements were accurate
and complete.194 The sections 302 and 404 rule requirements and the
section 906 criminal provisions were adopted against the background
of these SEC actions.
187 Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Form 10-Q was required to be signed on the
registrant's behalf by a duly authorized representative and by the principal financial
officer or the principal accounting officer of the registrant. The CEO might or might
not have signed the 10-Q form as a duly authorized representative.
188 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 302, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (West Supp. 2004).
189 Id. § 404, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262.
190 Id. § 906, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West Supp. 2004).
191 Controls and Procedures, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15 (2004).
192 Certification of Disclosure in Annual and Quarterly Reports, id.
§§ 240.13a-14(a).
193 Regulation of Securities Offerings, Exchange Act Release No. 40,632A, 63 Fed.
Reg. 67,174 (Dec. 4, 1998).
194 Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, Ex-
change Act Release No. 46,079, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,877 (June 20, 2002).
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j. The SEC's Executive Certification Proposal of June 2002
In 1998, as part of its "Aircraft Carrier" proposals, the SEC pro-
posed expanding the number of persons required to sign the Form
10-Q to include executive officers of the registrant, including the
CEO.' 95 The SEC proposal also would have required officers who sign
Forms 10-K and 10-Q to certify that they had read those reports and
that to their knowledge the reports contained no material misstate-
ments or omissions. The SEC hoped that the certification require-
ment would improve the quality of Exchange Act reporting by
increasing the involvement of top executives. 196 The Aircraft Carrier
proposals, although later abandoned, were an SEC attempt to en-
hance senior management's responsibility in periodic reports by using
attestation requirements.
The Enron financial reporting scandal raised serious public con-
cerns about whether senior executives were paying sufficient attention
to the periodic reporting process. On June 17, 2002, the SEC re-
newed its Aircraft Carrier CEO attestation proposal by publishing a
new proposal named "Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quar-
terly and Annual Reports." 197 Under this proposal, each CEO and
CFO would have been required to certify in annual and quarterly re-
ports that
* He or she has read the report;
* To his or her knowledge, the information in the report is true in
all important respects as of the end of the period covered by the
report; and
* The report contains all information about the company of which
he or she is aware that he or she believes is important to a rea-
sonable investor as of the end of the period covered by the
report.198
According to the SEC, senior management "should be involved"
in reviewing their companies' periodic reports and investors should
be able to view the certification as evidence of such management in-
volvement.1 99 The Commission clearly was dissatisfied with the passive
role played by senior management at some reporting companies. By
proposing the affirmative certification requirements on top of the ex-
195 Regulation of Securities Offerings, 63 Fed. Reg. at 67,174.
196 In the Aircraft Carrier Release, the SEC stated that "the disclosures made in
Exchange Act reports tend to be of a lesser quality than the disclosures made in Se-
curities Act filings." Id. at 67,245.
197 67 Fed. Reg. 41,877.
198 Id. at 41,879.
199 Id. at 41,880.
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isting signature requirements, the SEC sought to force top executives
to review companies' periodic reports more carefully and to partici-
pate in the reporting process more extensively.
The 1998 SEC Aircraft Carrier certification proposal had been
criticized as being unnecessary because signatories of periodic reports
were already subject to the antifraud law framework.200 However, ac-
cording to the SEC the goal of the 2002 proposal was not "to affect...
existing bases of liability" for CEOs and CFOs, but to reinforce the
responsibility of CEOs and CFOs regarding periodic reports and to
promote their more active and direct involvement. 20 1
The June 17, 2002, proposal would have required reporting com-
panies to maintain sufficient procedures to provide reasonable assur-
ances that the company was able to collect, process, and disclose the
information required to be disclosed in its periodic and current re-
ports filed under the Exchange Act.20 2 Reporting companies would
also have been required to evaluate the effectiveness of these proce-
dures and communicate the results to management. This responsibil-
ity was consistent with the books and records provisions of Exchange
Act section 13(b) (2), which requires reporting companies to maintain
internal accounting control procedures. 203 The Commission's June
200 In its comment letter to the SEC, the Committee on the Federal Regulation of
Securities of the Section of Business Law of the ABA wrote: "The Committee believes
that the substance of the statement proposed to be certified is already implied by the
signature on the report, and that the liability standard already inherent in executing
the filing is sufficient." See Letter from Committee on the Federal Regulation of Se-
curities, American Bar Association, to the Securities and Exchange Commission Re-
garding the Regulation of Securities Offerings (File No. 57-30-98) 96 (Sept. 28, 1999)
[hereinafter ABA Committee on the Federal Regulation of Securities Letter], availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/rules/propoed/573098/Kellerl.htm.
201 Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67
Fed. Reg. at 41,879.
202 Id.
203 The purpose of section 13(b) (2) is to maintain the integrity of a company's
internal records and controls. It was added to the Exchange Act in the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act in 1977. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213,
§ 102, 91 Stat. 1494, 1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000)). Section 13(b) (2) (A)
requires companies to make and keep books, records and accounts which, in reasona-
ble detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the issuer's
assets. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2) (A) (2000). Under section 13(b)(2) (B), companies
must devise and maintain systems of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide
reasonable assurances that (a) transactions are executed in accordance with manage-
ment's authorization; (b) transactions are recorded as necessary (i) to permit prepa-
ration of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles or other applicable criteria, and (ii) to maintain accountability for a com-
pany's assets; (c) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's
authorization; and (d) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with ex-
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17, 2002, certification proposal and its actions described below seem
to have stimulated the adoption of sections 302, 404, and 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
K. SEC Order 4-460: Certification for 94 7 Public Companies
On June 25, 2002, eight days after the SEC made its executive
certification proposal, WorldCom announced that it was restating its
2000 and 2001 financial reports due to accounting errors.
204
On June 27, 2002, the SEC published Order 4-460 requiring the
CEOs and CFOs of the 947 largest public companies to certify that
their company's most recent Form 10-K, and any Form 10-Q or Form
8-K filed since the most recent Form 10-K, were accurate and com-
plete.20 5 The scope of the applicable reports was broader than the
SEC's June 17 proposal, including not only periodic reports on Forms
10-K and 10-Q, but also current reports on Form 8-K.
By August 15, 2002, the deadline set by the order, CEOs and
CFOs of the vast majority of the companies subject to the order filed
certifications according to the order.
206
L. Criminal Penalties for False Certifications
Congress dramatically increased the criminal punishment at-
tached to false and misleading periodic reports. In section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it created a separate executive certification re-
quirement subject to substantial criminal penalties. Under section
906, the CEO and CFO of each reporting company must certify that
every periodic report fully complies with the reporting requirements
of the Exchange Act, and fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operation of the company.20 7 If an
executive certifies a report knowing that the certification is false, he or
she may be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years. If an executive willfully certifies a report knowing that
the certification is false, he or she may be fined not more than
isting assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any
differences. Id. § 78m(b) (2) (B).
204 On June 26, 2002, Chairman Pitt announced that the SEC would require pub-
lic company certification of their most recent financial statements. Harvey L. Pitt,
Remarks Before the Economic Club of New York (June 26, 2002), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch573.htm.
205 SEC Order No. 4-460 (June 27, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
other/4-460.htm.
206 The filing time and the certifications under Order 4-460 are available at http:/
/www.sec.gov/rules/extra/ceocfo.htm.
207 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 906(a), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West Supp. 2004).
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$5,000,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years. 208 Section 906
was effective immediately upon enactment and did not require SEC
rulemaking.
M. Management Certification Under Section 302 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Congress also became concerned about the reliability of corpo-
rate financial statements. 20 9 Section 302 of the Act, adopted under
the title of "Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports," required
the SEC, within thirty days of enactment, to issue final rules requiring
the principal executive officer and the principal financial officer of
each company filing periodic reports under section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Exchange Act to provide extensive certifications in the issuer's an-
nual and quarterly reports. 210 Section 302 incorporated the compo-
208 Id.
209 See S. REP. No. 107-205, at 25-26 (2002).
210 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241 (West Supp. 2004).
The Commission was required to adopt rules requiring the officers to verify that
(1) the signing officer has reviewed the report;
(2) based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain any un-
true statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading;
(3) based on such officer's knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in the report, fairly present in all mate-
rial respects the financial condition and results of operations of the is-
suer as of, and for, the periods presented in the report;
(4) the signing officers-
(A) are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls;
(B) have designed such internal controls to ensure that material infor-
mation relating to the issuer and its consolidated subsidiaries is
made known to such officers by others within those entities, partic-
ularly during the period in which the periodic reports are being
prepared;
(C) have evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer's internal controls as
of a date within 90 days prior to the report; and
(D) have presented in the report their conclusions about the effective-
ness of their internal controls based on their evaluation as of that
date;
(5) the signing officers have disclosed to the issuer's auditors and the audit
committee of the board of directors (or persons fulfilling the equivalent
function)-
(A) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
controls which could adversely affect the issuer's ability to record,
process, summarize, and report financial data and have identified
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nents of the SEC'sJune 17, 2002, proposal requiring certifying officers
to state that they have reviewed the reports and that the reports are
not materially misleading. The section went a step further by in-
structing executives to certify their affirmative participation in various
aspects of their companies' "internal controls," without providing a
clear definition for the latter term.
N. Certification Under Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Since the Commission had published its executive certification
proposal on June 17, 2002, it was able to meet the thirty-day deadline
established by the July 31 enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley by publishing
its final rules implementing section 302 on August 29, 2002.211 It
adopted new Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14, requiring all pe-
riodic reports filed on forms 10-K and 10-Q under Exchange Act sec-
tions 13(a) and 15(d) to be certified by CEOs and CFOs of the filing
companies. 212 Rules 13a-14(b) and 15d-14(b), as adopted in August
2002, closely followed the language of section 302 and set out the
terms of the executive certification to be included in the applicable
reports. However, on June 5, 2003, when the Commission adopted
final rules implementing section 404 of the Act, it also amended the
rules implementing section 302.213 The June 2003 amendments re-
moved the text of section 302 executive certification from Rules 13a-
for the issuer's auditors any material weaknesses in internal con-
trols; and
(B) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the issuer's internal
controls; and
(6) the signing officers have indicated in the report whether or not there
were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that
could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of
their evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to signifi-
cant deficiencies and material weaknesses.
Id.
211 Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, Ex-
change Act Release No. 46,427, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,276 (Sept. 9, 2002).
212 Id. at 57,277.
213 Management's Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certi-
fication of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Exchange Act Release No.
47,986, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 2003) [hereinafter Final 404 Rule Release].
This release contains final rules implementing section 404 of the Act as well as
amendments to final rules implementing section 302 of the Act.
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14(b) and 15d-14(b) and placed the certification language in a new
exhibit (31) to Item 601(b) of Regulation S-K. 214
214 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b) (31) (2004). The content of the certification is set forth
as follows:
1. I have reviewed this [specify report] of [identify registrant];
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period cov-
ered by this report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects
the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the regis-
trant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for es-
tablishing and maintaining disclosure control and procedures (as de-
fined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal
control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our super-
vision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by
others within those entities, particularly during the period in which
this report is being prepared;
(b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused
such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under
our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reli-
ability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial state-
ments for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles;
(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about
the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the
end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;
and
(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal con-
trol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's
most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in
the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is rea-
sonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board
of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):
(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are rea-
[VOL. 80:31144
AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
Section 302 of the Act requires that certifications be made "in
each annual or quarterly report" filed or submitted under the Ex-
change Act.2 1 5 In the final section 302 rules, the Commission con-
firmed that these certification requirements apply only to annual
reports on Form 10-K and quarterly reports on Form 10-Q not to re-
ports on Forms 6-K and 8-K, which are event-driven and not required
to be filed on an annual or quarterly basis.216 The amended Rule 13a-
14(b) requires the executive certification to be filed as an exhibit to
the applicable periodic report.
217
Subsection 3 of the required certification focuses on the financial
information disclosed in companies' periodic reports. As mandated
by section 302, these financial disclosures must "fairly represent" the
disclosing company's financial condition. In the adopting release, the
SEC emphasized its position that "fairly represent" is a higher stan-
dard than "fairly represent in accordance with GAAP." 2 18 It stated
that, "[p] resenting financial information in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles may not necessarily satisfy obligations
under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws." 21 9 It ad-
ded that the financial information disclosed in a report must be
"viewed in its entirety" and must meet a standard of overall material
accuracy and completeness that is broader than financial reporting
requirements under GAAP.
220
In subsection 2 of the certification, the Commission used "based
on my knowledge" to reflect the language "based on the officer's
knowledge" contained in section 302(a) (2).221 The term "knowledge"
sonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, pro-
cess, summarize and report financial information; and
(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or
other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's inter-
nal control over financial reporting.
Id.
215 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241.
216 Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67
Fed. Reg. at 57,280.
217 Certification of Disclosure in Annual and Quarterly Reports, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13a-14(b).
218 See Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports,
67 Fed. Reg. at 57,279 & n.55 (citing In re Caterpillar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
30,532, [1991-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,830, at 63,055
(Mar. 31, 1992); In re Edison Schools, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 45,925,
[2001-2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 75,070, at 63,367 (May 14,
1992)).
219 Id. at 57,279 n.55.
220 Id. at 57,279.
221 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a) (2), 15 U.S.C.A § 7241 (West Supp. 2004).
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is not defined in section 302 of the Act or in the Rule. Since the
required certification is subjective in nature, some commenters had
urged that the certifying officers should be allowed to certify informa-
tion to the extent of their "actual knowledge" and belief.2 22 To ad-
dress this concern, the adopting release stated that the certification
statements are "to be made based on the knowledge of the certifying
officer," and the rules are not intended "to change the current obliga-
tions of corporate officers in connection with the discharge of their
duties."2
23
With respect to the term "disclosure controls and procedures,"
the rules adopted in August 2002 and repeated in June 2003 defined
the phrase as
controls and other procedures of an issuer that are designed to en-
sure that information required to be disclosed by the issuer in the
reports that it files or submits under the Act (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.)
is recorded, processed, summarized and reported, within the time
periods specified in the Commission's rules and forms.224
Significantly, the phrase "disclosure controls and procedures" de-
scribes a broad internal control system that facilitates the flow of both
financial and non-financial information to "the issuer's management,
including its principal executive and principal financial officers, or
persons performing similar functions, as appropriate to allow timely
decisions regarding required disclosure. '" 225 Therefore, effective dis-
closure controls and procedures must serve two important functions.
First, the procedures must capture, on a comprehensive basis, all in-
formation that may be subject to disclosure under the Exchange Act
filings that the issuer is required to file.2 26 Second, the procedures
must be designed to ensure that the relevant information is communi-
cated to the issuer's top executives in a timely manner. These proce-
dures are fundamental to the SEC's efforts to improve the overall
quality of Exchange Act reports.
Significantly, although only periodic reports are subject to execu-
tive certification, disclosure controls and procedures are required to
222 See, e.g., Letter from Committee on Securities Regulation, Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, to the Securities and Exchange Commission, Regarding
File No. S7-21-02; Release Nos. 34-46,079 and 34-46,300 (Aug. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72102/cmnathanl.htm.
223 Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67
Fed. Reg. at 57,279.
224 Controls and Procedures, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(e) (2004).
225 Id.
226 Note that the definition of "disclosure controls and procedures" refers to "re-
ports" to be filed under the Exchange Act, not just "periodic reports."
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be designed to ensure full and timely disclosure in current reports as
well as in periodic reports. These procedures should help to facilitate
the real-time disclosure scheme that section 409 of the Act requires
the SEC to establish.
227
The Commission's June 2003 amendments did not change the
substance of the rules regarding "disclosure controls and procedure"
as established in August 2002. First, by referring to the certification
requirements specified under new Item 306(b) (31), Rules 13a-14 and
15d-14 effectively impose on top executives the duty to establish and
evaluate their companies' disclosure controls and procedures. 228 The
Commission also revised Rules 13a-15 and 15d-15 to require execu-
tives to evaluate the effectiveness of the issuer's disclosure control and
procedures at the end of each fiscal quarter and fiscal year. 22 9 Sec-
ond, according to the SEC, the reporting company should "assist" the
executives in making these procedures operate. 230 To this end, the
SEC has adopted rules 13a-15(a) and 15d-15(a), requiring each issuer
to maintain disclosure control and procedures (as defined in
Rules13a-14(e) and 15d-14(e) respectively). 231 Third, to streamline
management's obligation and the issuers' obligations regarding dis-
closure controls and procedures, the SEC added a new Item 307 to
Regulation S-K, directing the issuer to disclose, as a new line item in
10-K and 10-Q the conclusion and evaluation of its top executives re-
garding the effectiveness of the issuer's disclosure and control proce-
dures.232 The rules do not mandate any particular evaluation process.
Instead, the Commission indicates that each issuer should "develop a
process that is consistent with its business and internal management
and supervisory practices."
233
Although the definition of "disclosure controls and procedures"
and its operating rules seemed clear, the SEC's August 2002 approach
to the concept of "internal controls" caused some confusion.
Sarbanes-Oxley section 302(a) (5) and (6) required the certifying of-
ficers to disclose deficiencies in the design or operation of "internal
227 See the discussion of current disclosure and SEC rulemaking activities regard-
ing section 409, supra notes 87-106 and accompanying text.
228 See Certification of Disclosure in Annual and Quarterly Reports, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13a-14; Certification of Disclosure in Annual and Quarterly Reports, id.
§ 240.15d-14.
229 Id. § 240.13a-15(b), (c); Controls and Procedures, id. § 240.15d-15.
230 Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, Ex-
change Act Release No. 46,427, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,276, 57,280 (Sept. 9, 2002).
231 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(a); id. § 240.15d-15(a).
232 Regulation S-K, id. § 229.307.
233 Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, 67
Fed. Reg. at 57,281.
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controls" to the issuer's auditors and the audit committee. In the sec-
tion 302 rules adopted in 2001, the Commission did not provide its
own definition of "internal controls," but instead directed companies
to a "pre-existing" definition contained in Statement of Auditing Stan-
dards (AU) sections 319.06-.09.234
In the June 2003 amendments to rules implementing section 302,
the Commission admitted that there had been confusion over the
concept and the scope of "internal controls."
23 5 It dropped "internal
controls" from the certifications and relevant rules mandated by sec-
tion 302 of the Act, avoiding the difficulty of defining this 
term.2
3 6
The final rules adopted on June 5, 2003, revised the existing section
302 certification by replacing the term "internal controls" with the
new term "internal control over financial reporting," which was cre-
ated by the Commission to implement section 404.237
Section 302 and its implementing rules have significant practical
impact. To be able to make the required certification, top executives
must carefully review the disclosure reports and actively involve them-
selves in the process of preparing the disclosure reports. They cannot
234 Id. at 57,277 n.36; see AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, CODIFICATION
OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS, CONSIDERATION OF INTERNAL CONTROL 
IN A
FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT § 319 (2001).
235 See Final 404 Rule Release, Exchange Act Release No. 47,986, 68 Fed. Reg.
36,636, 36,638-39 (June 18, 2003). This release contains final rules implementing
section 404 of the Act as well as amendments to the final rule implementing section
302 of the Act.
236 Id. at 36,640.
237 The Commission further revised a series of pre-existing rules and created new
rules to define and operate the concept of "internal control over financial reporting"
in the context of fulfilling section 302 requirements. First, new Rule 13a-15(f) sets
forth the definition of "internal control over financial reporting." Controls and Pro-
cedures, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(f). Second, new Rules 13a-15(d) and 15d-15(d) spec-
ify executives' affirmative obligations to evaluate any material changes in the issuer's
internal controls over financial reporting during the applicable reporting period. Id.
§ 240.13a-15(d); Controls and Procedures, id. § 240.15d-15(d). Third, to establish
issuers' responsibilities with respect to this new concept, Rule 13a-15(a) is amended to
require that registrants maintain not only "disclosure controls and procedures," but
also "internal control over financial reporting." Id. § 240.13a-15(a). Finally, new
Item 308 of Regulation S-K requires the issuer to disclose in a new line item in 10-K
and 10-Q the conclusions of its top executives regarding any material changes in the
issuer's internal controls over financial reporting during the previous reporting pe-
riod. Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, id. § 229.308(c). Integrated into
the pre-existing rules regarding "disclosure controls and procedures," the new rules
effectively eased the confusion and harmonized the operation of rules implementing
section 302 of the Act.
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delegate these duties to the subordinate officers and merely sign a
blank signature page of the disclosure form.
238
1. Certification Under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act section 302 certification requirement in-
dicates that, in the view of Congress, senior management's responsi-
bility must include the process of preparing periodic reports. Section
404 of the Act, adopted under the title "Management Assessment of
Internal Controls," addresses this policy.23 9 Section 404 directs the
Commission to adopt rules requiring each annual report to contain
an "internal control report" (1) stating management's responsibilities
"for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control struc-
ture and procedures for financial reporting" and (2) containing an
assessment of the effectiveness of the company's "internal control
structure and procedures" for financial reporting. 240 The section fur-
ther requires auditor attestation regarding management's assessment.
The Commission proposed rules to implement section 404 of the
Act 24 1 on October 22, 2002, and finalized them on June 5, 2003.242
238 For a detailed discussion of various practical issues regarding executive certifi-
cation requirements, see John Huber, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Com-
mission Rule Making: Remarks at the 23d Annual Ray Garrett Jr. Corporate and
Securities Law Institute (Apr. 10-11, 2003).
239 Section 404 contains the following language:
(a) RULES REQUIRED.- The Commission shall prescribe rules requiring each
annual report required by section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) to contain an internal
control report, which shall-
(1) state the responsibility of management for establishing and main-
taining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for
financial reporting; and
(2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of
the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and
procedures of the issuer for financial reporting.
(b) INTERNAL CONTROL EVALUATION AND REPORTING.- With respect to the in-
ternal control assessment required by subsection (a), each registered
public accounting firm that prepares or issues the audit report for the
issuer shall attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the manage-
ment of the issuer. An attestation made under this subsection shall be
made in accordance with standards for attestation engagements issued
or adopted by the Board. Any such attestation shall not be the subject
of a separate engagement.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7262 (West Supp. 2004).
240 Id.
241 Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Exchange Act Release No. 46,701, 67 Fed. Reg. 66,208 (Oct. 30, 2002).
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The final rules place all disclosure requirements mandated by section
404 of the Act in a newly created Item 308 of Regulation S-K.
Under the new Item 308, an issuer's annual report must contain
an internal control report from management that includes
(1) A statement of management's responsibility for establishing and
maintaining adequate internal controls over financial reporting for
the registrant;
(2) A statement identifying the framework used by management to
evaluate the effectiveness of the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting... ;
(3) Management's assessment of the effectiveness of the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting as of the end of the regis-
trant's most recent fiscal year, including a statement as to whether
or not internal control over financial reporting is effective ... ; and
(4) A statement that the registered public accounting firm that au-
dited the financial statements included in the annual report.., has
issued an attestation report on management's assessment of the reg-
istrant's internal control over financial reporting.
243
Item 308 also directs issuers to include an auditor's attestation report
on management's assessment in the applicable annual report.
244
Section 404 provides no guidance for the term "internal control
structure and procedures for financial reporting."245 The final rule
substitutes the phrase "internal control over financial reporting," de-
fined as a process designed "to provide reasonable assurance regard-
ing the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of
financial statements for external purposes in accordance with gener-
ally accepted accounting principles. ' 246 The rule states that the pro-
cess must address the following three elements:
(1) The maintenance of records that in reasonable detail accurately
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of
the registrant;
242 Final 404 Rule Release, Exchange Act Release No. 47,986, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636
(June 18, 2003).
243 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.308(a) (1)-(4) (2004).
244 Id. § 229.308(b). Although the auditors' attestation reports are extremely im-
portant, this Article concentrates on corporate disclosure obligations. SEC rules and
PCAOB rules and standards implementing the audit attestation requirements under
section 404 of the Act are not discussed.
245 Final 404 Rule Release, Fed. Reg. at 36,640. Section II.A.2 of the Final 404
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(2) Reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as neces-
sary to permit preparation of financial statements in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles, and that receipts and
expenditures of the registrant are being made only in accordance
with authorizations of management and directors of the registrant;
and
(3) Reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection
of unauthorized acquisition, use or disposition of the registrant's
assets that could have a material effect on the financial
statements.
247
Compared with the section 404 rule proposal, this final definition
provides more certainty because the scope of the underlying process
does not depend on standards set up by an authority other than the
SEC.248 The three components specified by the definition effectively
narrow the scope of the internal control certification to those relevant
only to financial reporting.
Although section 404 requires only annual evaluation, the SEC
believes that quarterly evaluation will create "symmetry" between man-
agement's duty to evaluate both "internal controls and procedures for
financial reporting" and "disclosure controls and procedures." The
final rules require quarterly evaluation of "internal control over finan-
cial reporting," but not as extensive as the annual evaluation man-
dated by section 404 of the Act. According to the final rules, the
scope of management's quarterly evaluation is limited to changes that
materially affect, or are likely to materially affect, the internal controls
over financial reporting.
249
The October 2002 proposal did not specify the exact content of
the management report because according to the SEC doing so would
247 Id.
248 Id. The proposed section 404 rules would have defined the term "internal con-
trols and procedures over financial reporting" as
controls that pertain to the preparation of financial statements for external
purposes that are fairly presented in conformity with generally accepted ac-
counting principles as addressed by the Codification of Statements on Audit-
ing Standards § 319 or any superseding definition or other literature that is
issued or adopted by the Oversight Board.
Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406, and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Exchange Act Release No. 46,701, 67 Fed. Reg. 66,208, 66,220 (Oct. 30, 2002). By
referring to Auditing Standards section 319, the proposed definition would have in-
cluded elements of controls with respect to the effectiveness of companies' operation
and companies' compliance with laws not applicable to financial reporting. See dis-
cussion supra text accompanying note 234.
249 Final 404 Rule Release, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,644.
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likely result in "boilerplate responses of little value."2 50 Since the re-
port will contain judgments made by management that will form the
basis of the outside auditor's attestation, some commentators believed
that the SEC should provide guidance to the content of the manage-
ment report.251 In response, the Commission revised Rule 13a-15(c)
to provide that management's evaluation must be based on a "suita-
ble, recognized control framework that is established by a body or
group that has followed due-process procedures, including the broad
distribution of the framework for public comment."252 The final rule
release identified the established framework offered by the report on
internal controls issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organiza-
tions of the Treadway Commission, popularly known as "COSO," as
guidance that satisfies management's obligation to evaluate "internal
control over financial reporting."
253
0. Interplay of SEC Rules Implementing Sections 302 and 404
As discussed in the previous section, the final section 404 release
amended existing section 302 rules by replacing the term "internal
controls," which had been the center of confusion, with the more
clearly defined "internal control over financial reporting." In adopt-
ing the rules implementing section 404, the Commission tried to clar-
ify the relationship between "disclosure controls and procedures" and
"internal control over financial reporting."
The SEC's definitions suggest that "disclosure controls and proce-
dures" and "internal control over financial reporting" overlap. Recog-
nizing this overlap, the Commission integrated the rules
implementing sections 302 and 404 to achieve consistency in the oper-
ation of the two sets of rules. First, revised Rule 13a-15 defines these
two concepts in subsections (e) and (f) respectively. 254 Second, Rule
13a-15(b) establishes management's affirmative obligation to evaluate
"disclosure controls and procedures" to fulfill the certification re-
250 Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 67 Fed. Reg. at 66,219.
251 See, e.g., ABA Commission on the Federal Regulation of Securities Letter, supra
note 200, at 84.
252 Controls and Procedures, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(c) (2004).
253 See Final 404 Rule Release, 68 Fed. Reg. at 36,642. The COSO report provides
certain guidance on management reporting on internal controls, which had been
applied by certain banking institutions and bank holding companies subject to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act in connection with their
managements' evaluation and report on internal control. The release did not make
the guidance contained in the COSO Report mandatory.
254 Controls and Procedures, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(e)-(f).
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quirement under section 302.255 Third, Rule 13a-15(c) and (d) estab-
lish management's affirmative obligation to evaluate the effectiveness
and to disclose material changes in "internal control over financial
reporting" to fulfill the reporting requirements under section 404 and
the certification requirement under section 302 respectively.
256
Fourth, revised Rule 13a-15(a) directs the issuer to maintain both "dis-
closure controls and procedures" and "internal control over financial
reporting."257 Finally, Items 307 and 308 of Regulation S-K require
the issuer to disclose, as different line items, management's section
302 certifications and section 404 reports respectively. 258 In practice,
there may be different opinions about whether certain internal con-
trol processes should fall into "disclosure controls and procedures"
and "internal control over financial reporting." Such differences
should not affect a company's compliance with a series of well organ-
ized SEC rules because the establishment, maintenance, and disclo-
sure of such controls and process are required as long as they fit into
the definitions of either "disclosure controls and procedures" or "in-
ternal control over financial reporting."
P. The SEC Role Regarding Section 906 of the Act
As discussed above, section 906 of the Act is a criminal provision,
which is codified as an amendment to the federal criminal code. The
SEC has taken the position that section 906 is not within its jurisdic-
tion, since the SEC has no criminal enforcement powers. 259 However,
since section 906 mandates a separate executive certification, the most
effective way to operate section 906 certification is through the ex-
isting federal securities law framework dealing with disclosure of
certifications.
On June 5, 2003, the SEC adopted requirements for disclosure of
the certification required by sections 302 and 906 of the Act. 260 The
rule requires both 302 and 906 certifications to be filed as an exhibit
to the applicable periodic reports, rather than as a separate section
255 Id. § 240.13(a)-15(b).
256 Id. § 240.13(a)-15(c)-(d).
257 Id. § 240.13(a)-15(a).
258 Regulation S-K, id. §§ 229.307-.308.
259 SEC staff and commissioners stated this position during its open meeting on
August 27, 2002. See Bruce C. Bennett & Graham Robinson, Executive Certification, in
PRACTISING LAW INST., 34TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 529, 551
n.49 (2002).
260 Final 404 Rule Release, Exchange Act Release No. 47,986, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636
(June 18, 2003); Certification of Disclosure in Certain Exchange Act Reports, Ex-
change Act Release No. 47,551, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,600 (Mar. 31, 2003).
2005] 1153
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
following the signature section.2 61 The SEC's amendments require is-
suers to furnish the section 906 certifications as an exhibit to the peri-
odic reports. 262 Although filed as an exhibit to the periodic reports,
the certifications required by section 906 are "deemed" to be "fur-
nished," rather than "filed" to the SEC.2 63 Therefore, certifications
under section 906 will not be subject to liability under section 18 of
the Exchange Act, which is applicable only to filed documents and will
not be subject to automatic incorporation by reference into an issuer's
Securities Act registration statements. However, since the section 906
certification disclosure is mandated, failure to file may result in a vio-
lation of section 13(a) of the Exchange Act.
Q Certification Summary
In response to the collapse of Enron, the Commission sought to
enhance the responsibility of top management to their companies'
financial disclosures by renewing its previous executive certification
rule proposals. Apart from top management's certification of the ac-
curacy and completeness of financial disclosure, the SEC proposal
would have required the issuer to maintain a sufficient internal con-
trol process for financial and non-financial reporting, and would have
required management certification of the effectiveness of the internal
process. These proposals were enacted in sections 302 and 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Section 906 of the Act further enhanced manage-
ment's responsibility for financial disclosure by seriously increasing
the criminal penalties for knowingly or willfully false certifications.
Through the rules implementing sections 302, 404, and 906, the Com-
mission has in effect mandated the management of public companies
to establish a comprehensive internal control system that can capture
both financial and non-financial information for disclosure purposes.
To be able to certify both the results and the procedures for financial
disclosure, top management must devote sufficient time and effort to
preparing SEC periodic reports. The SEC executive certification rules
are dramatically changing the internal disclosure and control environ-
ment in most public companies and effectively improving the quality
of public company disclosure. 264




264 Many corporations are complaining that compliance with the section 404 certi-
fication requirements regarding internal controls is too costly. The appropriate reply
is that these controls will greatly increase the public's confidence in corporate finan-
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R. Conclusion Regarding the SEC's Disclosure Initiatives
The SEC's reforms of the disclosure system have effectuated fun-
damental improvements to the existing disclosure system. The SEC
has ensured more timely information flows to investors by accelerat-
ing filing deadlines of periodic reports and current reports, and by
expanding the triggering events of the current reports. It has en-
hanced the disclosure in the MD&A section of the periodic reports by
mandating detailed discussions of companies' critical accounting poli-
cies, off-balance sheet transactions, and material contractual obliga-
tions. It has adopted pro forma disclosure regulations.
In contrast to the familiar methods of disclosure in Forms 10-K,
10-Q and 8-K, the new provisions mandating executive certification
present a major departure from prior practice. The certification provi-
sions address not only the accuracy of disclosure, but also the integrity
of companies' internal disclosure processes. The affirmative duties im-
posed on top management, combined with increased potential crimi-
nal liability imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, should cause
management to be active in assuring that controls are in place and
disclosures are sufficient. The disclosure reforms mandated by
Sarbanes-Oxley together with the SEC's actions in expanding disclo-
sure duties should substantially improve public companies' disclosure
and help to restore public confidence in the securities market.
IV. SEC RESOURCES
The Commission's enforcement and disclosure actions and policy
initiatives both before and after the Enron scandal present a record of
an SEC that has actively pursued its mission. Nevertheless, the SEC
has not had the levels of staff and funding that permit it to accomplish
its goals in the most effective manner. During the period prior to the
adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Commission regularly sought
increases in its budget, telling Congress that it did not have sufficient
resources to perform its regulatory mission. 265 From 1991 to 2001,
the SEC staff grew from 2301 to 2936.266 Comparing the Commis-
sion's staffing levels during that period shows that Commission staff
levels did not keep pace with industry growth:
cial statements, particularly in those companies whose internal controls were so insuf-
ficient that large expenditures are required to bring them into compliance.
265 See, e.g., Pitt, supra note 40.
266 See infra app. A.
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* Although the value of public offerings increased from $587 bil-
lion to $2535 billion, the SEC's disclosure review staff increased
from 238 to only 259.
" Although the assets of New York Stock Exchange member firms
grew from $604 billion to $2718 billion, the SEC's review staff
increased from 180 to only 281.
" Although investment adviser assets under management in-
creased from $5.4 trillion to twenty trillion dollars the SEC re-
view staff increased from 140 to only 376.267
In March 2002, the General Accounting Office issued a report on
SEC operations showing the disparity between the growth of the SEC
and the growth of the market it regulates. 268 It noted that in 2001, the
SEC was charged with supervisory duties relating to nine securities ex-
changes; the over-the-counter market, approximately seventy alterna-
tive trading systems; twelve registered clearing agencies; 8000
registered broker dealers employing over 700,000 registered repre-
sentatives; 8000 transfer agents; 5000 investment companies; 7400 reg-
istered investment advisers; and 14,000 companies that file annual
reports with the Commission. 269 The report also noted dramatic
growth in the number of individuals investing in mutual funds, the
total dollars invested in mutual funds, and the increased complexity
and internationalization of the securities markets.
The GAO identified challenges faced by the Commission as
follows:
First, resource constraints have contributed to substantial delays in
the turnaround time for many SEC regulatory and oversight activi-
ties, such as approval for rule filings and exemptive applications.
Second, SEC's resource constraints contributed to bottlenecks in
the examination and inspection area as workload grew. Third, lim-
ited resources have forced SEC to be selective in its enforcement
activities and have lengthened the time required to complete cer-
tain enforcement investigations. Fourth, certain filings were subject
to less frequent and less complete reviews as workloads increased.
Fifth, today's technology-driven markets have created ongoing
budgetary and staff challenges. Finally . . . the SEC has been in-
creasingly challenged in addressing emerging issues, such as the
267 SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, AGENCY RESOURCES AND INDUSTRY GROWTH (2002) (on
file with the authors).
268 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, SEC
OPERATIONS: INCREASED WORKLOAD CREATES CHALLENGES (2002).
269 Id. at 3.
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ongoing internationalization of securities markets and technology-
driven innovations like ATSs and exchange-traded funds.
270
The Commission's authorized budget for fiscal 2002 was approxi-
mately $514 million, and its appropriated budget during that year was
$487 million. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act dramatically increased the
SEC's authorized budget for fiscal year 2003 to $776 million. 271 The
Commission's appropriated budget for fiscal year 2003 increased to
$619 million. Its estimated appropriated budget for fiscal year 2004 is
$791.5 million, and its requested budget for 2005 is $913 million.
272
As a result, Commission staffing levels have, and will, increase dramati-
cally, from 2936 staff members in fiscal year 2001 and 3009 in fiscal
year 2002 to 3932 (estimated) in fiscal year 2005.273 These increases
should have the largest impact in the Commission's enforcement pro-
gram and in the ability of the Division of Corporation Finance to re-
view disclosure documents. Nevertheless, the SEC's use of
rulemaking, interpretations, and concept releases as a means of affect-
ing conduct in the disclosure area will remain its primary means of
increasing the quality of corporate disclosures.
CONCLUSION
This Article has reviewed aspects of the responses by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission to Enron and other corporate frauds,
and the Commission's prompt actions in implementing the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act's provisions. Examination of the timing and content of the
Commission's actions leads to the conclusion that despite its lack of
adequate resources, the SEC has done an admirable job of protecting
the public interest. Its enforcement program has been vigorous. Its
strong influence on the self-regulatory organizations had the effect of
increasing corporate governance protections for shareholders. Its im-
aginative suggestion for an accounting oversight board provided im-
portant impetus for congressional creation of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board. Its disclosure initiatives, both before
and after adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley, have greatly enhanced the envi-
ronment for corporate disclosure in the public interest.
270 Id. at 11-12.
271 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 601, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78kk (West Supp. 2004).
272 See infra app. A.
273 Id.
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APPENDIX A. SEC BUDGET AUTHORITY, ACTUAL OBLIGATIONS,
AND STAFF YEARS ($ IN 000'S)
Fiscal Budget Actual Staff
Year Authority Obligations Years
274
191 8908 17S 23011
1992 225,792 224,281 2491
1I9I 15,3 2717 273
1994 269,150 266,249 2650
1996 300,921 296,533 2767
199 30411,500 308,591* 2771
1998 315,000 311,143 2768
2000 377,000 369,825 2840
2002 513,989 487,345 3009
2004 811,500 791,500* 3592*
2005 913,000 913,000** 3932**
*Estimated
**Requested
274 Staff years are given in full-time equivalents. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
BUDGET ESTIMATE, FISCAL 2005 (2004); SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, BUDGET ESTIMATE,
FISCAL 2004 (2003); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Frequently Requested FOJA Document: SEC
Budget History vs. Actual Expenses, available at http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/
budgetact.htm (last modified Apr. 2, 2003); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Frequently
Requested FOIA Documents: Full-Time Equivalents History, available at http://www.sec.
gov/foia/docs/fulltimes.htm (last modified Apr. 2, 2004).
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